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prove criminal violations. This model, while subject to skepticism and
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how laws controlling the conduct of corporate investigations are critical to
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governing self-incrimination, employee rights, data privacy, and legal
privilege, among other areas, largely determine the relative powers of
governments and corporations to collect and use evidence of business crime,
and thus the incentives for enforcers to offer settlements that reward firms
for private efforts to both prevent and disclose employee misconduct. This
Article demonstrates the central role that the law controlling corporate
investigations plays in determining the effects of corporate criminal liability
and enforcement policies. It argues that discussions underway in Europe and
elsewhere about expanding both corporate criminal liability and settlement
policies—as well as conversations about changes to the U.S. system—must
account for the effects of differences in investigative law if effective
incentives for reducing corporate crime are, as they should be, a principal
goal.
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INTRODUCTION
American criminal and civil enforcement officials have, to date, been
international leaders in their ability to obtain a large and steady volume of
high-profile settlements from the world’s largest corporations.1 The United
States has pursued many more corporate criminal enforcement actions than
any other nation, collected vastly more sanctions than any other country, and
occupied center stage in the global enforcement arena.2 This dominance is
1. See, e.g., Corporate Prosecution Registry, LEGAL DATA LAB, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html [https://perma.cc/HHZ5-837A]; Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., fcpa.stanford.edu [https://perma.cc/GTR7-VXE7];
Violation Tracker, GOOD JOBS FIRST, https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/violation-tracker [https://perma.cc/
SZ7Y-FCDM].
2. For example, in 2011, the United States imposed criminal sanctions on seventy-six
organizations; this constituted 84 percent of the total number of sanctions imposed against legal persons
around the world. No other country sanctioned more than four companies. ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, 2011 DATA ON
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 3 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
AntiBriberyConventionEnforcement2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CMK-HZCC]. In 2018, the U.S.
accounted for 136 of the 203 (67 percent) criminal sanctions imposed throughout the world on legal
persons. The next most active jurisdictions, Germany and the United Kingdom, sanctioned only eleven
and ten companies, respectively, for foreign bribery. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
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largely due to the broad scope of its corporate criminal liability rule,
combined with a policy governing enforcement and sanctions designed to
encourage corporate self-reporting, cooperation, and settlement.3
Unlike in most other countries, in the United States companies can be
held criminally liable for almost any crime committed by any employee in
the scope of employment, through the doctrine of respondeat superior
liability.4 The United States also has a stated policy of offering to resolve
cases through deferred and non-prosecution agreements (“DPAs” and
“NPAs”)5 if firms self-report criminal conduct or fully cooperate with
government efforts to investigate and prosecute.6 DPAs and NPAs not only
impose lower sanctions, but also do not trigger the collateral consequences
that can follow a formal conviction, such as debarment or delicensing.7 The
longstanding practice of settling most cases against publicly-held and other
large corporations in this way, in lieu of indictment and conviction, has
enabled enforcement authorities to leverage corporate compliance programs
and internal investigations to detect and obtain actionable evidence of
misconduct, thereby allowing simultaneous pursuit of numerous complex
enforcement actions.8
DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, 2018 ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION: INVESTIGATIONS, PROCEEDINGS, AND SANCTIONS 2–4 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/corru
ption/anti-bribery/OECD-Anti-Bribery-Convention-Enforcement-Data-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY86
-YQ7R].
3. In addition, the United States has adopted powerful statutes, with transnational reach, that
subject both domestic and foreign corporations to sanction by American prosecutors for acts overseas.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2018) (foreign bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2018) (computer fraud and abuse); id. § 1952 (travel in aid of racketeering); id. § 1956(a)(2) (prohibited
currency transportation); 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2018) (bank secrecy); 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2018) (export
controls).
4. Respondeat superior also requires that the employee had some intent to benefit the company.
See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1909); United States
v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975).
5. Under a DPA, the prosecutor files charges but agrees to dismiss the charges, without
conviction, if the corporation complies with the terms of the agreement. Under an NPA, the prosecutor
agrees not to file charges against the firm if the corporation fulfills the bargain. See David M. Uhlmann,
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability,
72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1303–15, 1326 (2013).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL],
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual [https://perma.cc/ZW5D-WZE8]; see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal
Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144,
152 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
7. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 882, 886 (2007).
8. We focus on publicly-held firms and large privately-held firms because these are the firms that
usually enter into DPAs and NPAs. Small owner-managed firms typically do not cooperate to get such
agreements because (1) owner-managers often are implicated in the wrongdoing, (2) such firms have little
to gain from settlement because they often cannot survive the fine (even if imposed through a DPA), or
(3) prosecutors do not need cooperation because they can obtain evidence within such firms relatively
easily. See Arlen, supra note 6, at 148, 152–53. Our analysis is limited to crimes that could produce a
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As other countries observed the progress of American enforcers,
especially in imposing sanctions on other nations’ companies doing business
globally, some acquired a taste for a greater presence in corporate
enforcement. Meanwhile, the expanding role of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) in the global effort to
control corporate bribery increased pressure on other countries to strengthen
corporate enforcement efforts.9 U.S. law and practices, whatever their faults,
offer the most salient model for nations motivated to expand the laws and
institutions of corporate enforcement.10
The arguments in favor of an approach like the one pursued in the
United States are familiar. Both broad organizational liability and
enforcement policies that enable companies to enter into corporate criminal
settlements short of conviction, if they self-report or cooperate, are effective
tools for reducing corporate crime.11 In theory, corporate liability deters by
corporate conviction, such as corrupting a foreign official, fraud, and money laundering, as distinct from
purely personal crimes by employees, such as receiving a bribe, or most insider trading.
9. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1;
Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The Market for Global Anticorruption Enforcement, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 197–200 (2017); Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD AntiBribery Convention, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/investment/co
untryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/DH3S-ZAVH].
10. At the time of the OECD convention on foreign bribery, the U.S. had the broadest regime
governing corporate liability for corruption. Following the convention, forty of the forty-one countries
who are parties reformed their laws governing corporate liability to create or expand corporate its scope.
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE LIABILITY OF LEGAL
PERSONS FOR FOREIGN BRIBERY: A STOCKTAKING REPORT 8 (2016) [hereinafter THE LIABILITY OF
LEGAL PERSONS FOR FOREIGN BRIBERY], https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Liability-LegalPersons-Foreign-Bribery-Stocktaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC5Y-VJZT]. See generally Sara Sun Beale
& Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (2004) (comparing corporate criminal liability
in Western Europe and the United States); Markus Rübenstahl & Christian Brauns, Trial and Error—A
Critique of the New German Draft Code for a Genuine Corporate Criminal Liability, 16 GERMAN L.J.
871 (2015) (discussing a German bill that creates corporate criminal liability); Frederick Davis, Limited
Corporate Criminal Liability Impedes French Enforcement of Foreign Bribery Laws, GLOBAL
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Sept. 1, 2016), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/09/01/guest-postunduly-limited-corporate-criminal-liability-impedes-french-enforcement-of-foreign-bribery-laws [https:
//perma.cc/PUB4-V7J5] (discussing France’s attempts to expand corporate criminal liability under the
U.S. model). Following adoption by the United States of deferred and non-prosecution agreements, other
countries also have moved to implement negotiated non-trial corporate criminal resolutions. See Jennifer
Arlen, The Promise and Perils of Introducing Deferred Prosecution Agreements Outside the U.S., in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS (Abiola Makinwa & Tina Söreide eds.,
forthcoming 2020) (discussing U.K. and French law on corporate criminal liability); ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL
RESOLUTIONS: SETTLEMENTS AND NON-TRIAL AGREEMENTS BY PARTIES TO THE ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION 28–37 (2019) [hereinafter RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL
RESOLUTIONS], https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Resolving-foreign-bribery-cases-with-non-trial-r
esolutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VPQ-9EQH] (describing other countries’ growing use of non-trial
corporate criminal resolutions).
11. E.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
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increasing the probability that corporations will expect crime to be costly
instead of profitable. This can induce corporate managers to pursue
prevention efforts. In addition, corporate liability can deter by increasing the
expected cost to employees of corporate misconduct. Employees face a
substantially higher threat of punishment when corporations have strong
incentives to detect misconduct, report it, investigate it, and provide
actionable evidence to government officials about individual wrongdoers—
that is, a motive to engage in corporate policing.
Corporate policing has particular public value in the United States
because under American law large, complex firms are better able to obtain
evidence about individual misconduct within the corporation than are
government officials situated outside the corporation.12 U.S. enforcement
policy strives to induce corporate policing by offering settlements without
criminal convictions (such as DPAs and NPAs) and with reduced fines to
companies that self-report or fully cooperate and remediate;13 the United
States even offers declinations to many companies that self-report, fully
cooperate, and remediate.14
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 688–95 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 866–67 (1994); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence
of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239–42 (1993); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser,
An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF.
L. REV. 1345, 1380 (1982); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 857–58 (1984); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93
YALE L.J. 1231, 1231–33 (1984).
12. Our methodological approach in this Article is to assume an established theoretical model for
corporate criminal liability, for which we have argued elsewhere. See, e.g., SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL
OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 109–75 (2016); Arlen &
Kraakman, supra note 11, at 688–95; Arlen, supra note 6, at 154–62; Arlen, supra note 10; Samuel W.
Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 474–78 (2006) We recognize
that the model and its implementation have skeptics. For some of the more thorough critiques, see
generally JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017); BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014); Uhlmann, supra note 5, at 1295–302; Jed S. Rakoff, The
Financial Crisis: Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9,
2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions [h
ttps://perma.cc/ZH25-MCMP].
13. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6. This approach has spread beyond criminal enforcement to
civil regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). E.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001)
(“Seaboard Report”); U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT ADVISORY:
COOPERATION FACTORS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION SANCTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPANIES
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/docu
ments/legalpleading/enfadvisorycompanies011917.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WMT-X2YC].
14. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-47.120 (FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy).
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Other countries are seeking to enhance corporate enforcement with
reforms adapted from the U.S. approach. Such reforms have included
expanding the scope of corporate criminal liability and adopting laws and
policies that allow negotiated criminal settlements, including DPAs and
NPAs, typically targeted at firms that self-report or cooperate.15 The
international debate surrounding such reforms has focused on the general
desirability of taking an instrumental, deterrence-focused approach to rules
and policies concerning corporate criminal liability and enforcement
settlements. In the United States as well, critiques of the system of corporate
criminal enforcement have been directed mostly at how enforcers have
settled large corporate actions, including the type and size of sanctions
imposed on firms (as well as individuals) and the form of criminal
resolutions.16
These debates have focused on the comparative analysis of corporate
liability regimes without attending sufficiently to a host of other laws—
which we refer to collectively as the law of corporate investigations—that
determine the extent to which enforcement authorities benefit from inducing
corporations to conduct and share with them the fruits of both their
monitoring and detection efforts when conducting corporate compliance, and
their internal investigations when responding to misconduct.17 The law
governing corporate investigations includes four important fields:
(1) doctrines determining employees’ rights during government
interrogation, including laws on self-incrimination and rights to counsel;
(2) employment laws governing employers’ ability to discipline and
terminate employees for failure to cooperate in investigations, including both
substantive and procedural rights of employees; (3) laws determining
employers’ access to employees’ workplace communications and activities,
including data privacy and surveillance rules; and (4) the law governing the
activities of counsel for corporations and their employees, including
15. See, e.g., Loi 2016-1691 du 9 Décembre 2016 Relative à la Transparence à la Lutte Contre la
Corruption et à la Modernisation de la Vie Économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 on
Transparency in the Fight Against Corruption and the Modernization of Economic Life], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FRANCE], Dec. 10, 2016
(“Sapin II”); U.K. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE ET AL., GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS,
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/?wpdmdl=1457
[https://perma.cc/P9RL-B9S4];
Deferred
Prosecution
Agreements, U.K. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-pr
otocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements [https://perma.cc/JQD9-A8BH]. For a discussion of these
reforms, see Arlen, supra note 10.
16. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 5, at 1344; see also Miriam H. Baer, When the Corporation
Investigates Itself, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 308,
308–310 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
17. Kevin Davis similarly emphasizes the application of a central point from comparative law
studies that the effects of adopting a given doctrine depend heavily on the surrounding legal environment,
including institutional arrangements. KEVIN E. DAVIS, BETWEEN IMPUNITY AND IMPERIALISM: THE
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 154–55 (2019).
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attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines.18
This Article makes three principal contributions to the study of
corporate crime. First, it shows that the value to U.S. prosecutors of inducing
corporations to investigate and provide prosecutors with information about
misconduct rests, to a considerable degree, on a range of U.S. laws that give
firms a comparative advantage over enforcers in gathering evidence of
corporate misconduct, particularly in the early stages of inquiries. Second, it
demonstrates that most other countries pursuing reforms in the area of
corporate crime have materially different laws controlling public and private
access to evidence of white-collar offenses. These differences can alter both
the expected value of corporate investigations and the relative positions of
corporations and enforcement authorities in investigating corporate
misconduct, such that some public officials overseas may be in an
equivalent, or even superior, position to private corporations to investigate
and gather evidence. Finally, it examines how differences in law governing
corporate investigations can alter the manner in which effective enforcement
policy can and should reward firms for private efforts to reduce crime.
There are, of course, extensive additional differences across legal
systems, too numerous and complex to treat in a single article, that influence
the progress of efforts to expand corporate criminal liability and public
enforcement.19 These include, most prominently, laws and institutions
18. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1614–17
(2007); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (2007). In defining the law governing corporate investigations, we focus on
laws governing corporate investigations that would persist after introduction of DPAs—and thus
alteration of existing law governing prosecutorial discretion. For a discussion of differences in the law
controlling prosecutorial discretion in the United States and Germany, see Edward B. Diskant,
Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 159–65 (2008).
Our analysis of laws governing investigations also does not cover laws that protect corporate
employees who blow the whistle on wrongdoing, either internally or externally, from retaliation. These
laws are an important feature of any jurisdiction’s overall legal framework for addressing corporate crime.
Indeed, reform discussions on this subject are growing more lively and interesting. See TRANSPARENCY
INT’L, WHISTLEBLOWING IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTEBLOWERS IN THE EU 6–7 (2013),
https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2013_WhistleblowingInEurope_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F
HU8-59AC]; Whistleblower Protection: Commission Sets New, EU-Wide Rules, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION (Apr. 23, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3441 [https:
//perma.cc/CU6U-XJHT]. We leave this important field of law for later work because legal protections
for employee whistleblowers (or the lack thereof) are a factor endogenous to the relative legal powers of
public enforcers and firms to gather evidence of corporate crime. In addition, one cannot easily assess the
relative protections for internal and external whistleblowers in the United States (which has a variety of
anti-retaliation provisions) and abroad (which tends not to) in light of employees’ greater protection
against termination and other sanctions in many other countries. The relevance of bounty systems for
rewarding whistleblowers is addressed briefly later in this Article. See infra notes 52, 105, 132 and
accompanying text.
19. See Karen J. Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The Experience of the
Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 629, 629–33 (2012); Frank Dobbin et al., The Global
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controlling prosecutorial discretion, the extent to which civil regulatory and
liability regimes are available alongside corporate criminal liability, the
scope of liability for white-collar offenses, laws governing whistleblowers,
and norms that influence management and employee behavior. This Article’s
comparative focus is solely on the laws governing investigative powers.
Because a primary goal and effect of introducing DPAs and their equivalents
is to enhance the scope and role of corporate investigations, the doctrines
governing these investigations are the logical place to begin expanding
analysis of how enforcement of corporate criminal liability will differ across
legal systems. In addition, investigative law is, at present, an area in which
foreign jurisdictions active in corporate enforcement vary not only from U.S.
law but also among themselves.
Part I of this Article explains the U.S. model of corporate criminal
liability and describes how that model is influencing the development of law
and its enforcement in other nations. Part II explains the doctrines in
American law that constitute the law of corporate investigations and shows
how those laws allocate powers between the government and firms. Part III
explains how the investigative laws of other nations greatly differ, and thus
place governments and corporations in different positions relative to
investigating corporate misconduct. Part IV examines how differences in
relative access to and control over evidence between corporations and
enforcers affects analysis of how to shape law and settlement policies to deal
effectively with corporate crime.
I. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND OVERSEAS
This Part details the U.S. approach to corporate crime control and the
steps other countries are taking to follow the U.S. model. It discusses how
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has pursued a policy that seeks to
target liability at individual wrongdoers by structuring corporate liability in
a manner designed to induce corporations to both detect and self-report
misconduct, and to aid government investigations by conducting, and
sharing the fruits of, private investigations. It then describes how other
countries have begun reforming their systems in the direction of the U.S.
approach, by both expanding the scope of corporate criminal liability and
introducing negotiated corporate settlements.
Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV.
SOC. 449, 449 (2007); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 442 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006); Katerina Linos, Note, When Do Policy Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates of LessonDrawing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1467, 1467–71 (2006); Mathias Siems, Malicious Legal Transplants, 38
LEGAL STUD. 103–04 (2018).
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A. SETTLEMENT AND U.S. DE FACTO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The American approach to corporate criminal liability and its
enforcement begins with the nature of crime within organizations.
Misconduct by large economic enterprises can impose greater social harms
than individual crime due to the leveraging effects of team production and
firms’ assets. The size and complexity of such organizations also makes
crime hard to detect and punish. In addition, wrongful business behaviors are
often embedded within ordinary and lawful economic activities and
frequently implicate statutes, like fraud laws, that have contestable
boundaries.20 Low risk of detection impedes governments’ efforts to use
criminal sanctions to deter misconduct because people tend not to fear
sanctions that they believe are rarely imposed.21 Moreover, misconduct by
large firms, particularly publicly held firms, can be difficult to deter because
employees regularly benefit personally from such actions and thus are not
adequately deterred by the mere threat that the firm may be sanctioned.22
In the U.S. system, corporations are able to detect and investigate
individual misconduct at far less public cost than if the government
attempted to police corporate crime in a manner comparable to policing of
street crime. Firms can deploy compliance programs to deter and detect
misconduct, pursue internal investigations to develop proof of misconduct,
report detected wrongdoing to the government, and assist the government in
gathering probative evidence of crime.23 Moreover, with firms that fail to
prevent serious crime, the common criminal enforcement goals of specific
deterrence and rehabilitation can be promoted by imposing on firms the costs
and other burdens of corporate overhaul through forfeiture of the benefits of
misconduct, adoption of internal reforms (for example, to a firm’s
compliance program or its practices in the offending line of business),
acceptance of an external monitor, or discipline of implicated employees and
responsible managers.24 Firms can be threatened with heightened sanctions
20. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 554–59 (2015);
Samuel W. Buell, “White Collar” Crimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 837 (Markus
D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014).
21. E.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 706; Arlen, supra note 11, at 833–37.
22. Corporate crime, in other words, is an agency cost. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney,
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691,
701; Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV.
315, 315–20 (1991).
23. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 688–95. Firms also can deter through internal systems
that make it more difficult to commit misconduct and through employee compensation and retention
policies that encourage compliance and sanction agents who violate the law. Id.
24. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-47.120; see Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate
Governance Regulation Through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 353–365 (2017) (discussing
when mandated compliance programs and monitors promote deterrence); Vikramaditya Khanna &
Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713,
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if they do not follow through on such requirements.
In light of structural and political realities that prevent prosecutors and
law enforcement agents from having the resources and public support to
comprehensively and intrusively surveil activities inside large corporations,
business firms thus can be viewed not only as a source of crime but also as a
resource in crime prevention.25 Policing activities by firms make employees
less likely to violate the law, both because a firm’s systems may prevent them
from doing so in the first instance and because employees are less likely to
engage in misconduct when faced with the higher probability of detection
and sanctioning that results from the coordinated efforts of their employers
and government enforcers. Public enforcement policies can not only promote
private policing but, depending on the government’s particular policy goals,
can also differentially reward preventive compliance efforts, self-reporting
of detected crime, cooperation in the gathering and furnishing of evidence,
and reforms to prevent future violations.
The doctrine of corporate criminal liability is the starting point for this
model of enforcement. In the United States, criminal respondeat superior
doctrine permits holding corporations criminally liable for all crimes
committed by all employees in the scope of employment with some intent to
benefit the company.26 As corporate enforcement grew in the 1980s and
1990s, it became apparent that respondeat superior liability—which holds a
firm liable for any crime by any employee at any level, regardless of whether
the firm had an effective compliance program or engaged in self-reporting
and cooperation—is not the best way to deter crime by individual actors
within large firms. Firms held liable for all employee misconduct will be
discouraged from seeking to discover, disclose, and investigate if such
efforts will only assist enforcement authorities in imposing higher corporate
sanctions. As a result, individual wrongdoers are likely to evade sanction.27
The Criminal Division of the DOJ and influential United States
Attorneys’ Offices, through a series of policy memoranda and practices
developed across many corporate criminal settlements,28 replaced the de jure
1714–15 (2007) (discussing when monitors promote deterrence).; see also Jonathan J. Rusch,
Memorandum to the Compliance Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 69, 86 (2016).
25. BUELL, supra note 12, at 109–175; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 688–95; Arlen, supra
note 11, 833–37.
26. N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909); Thomas J.
Bernard, The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 8–11 (1984);
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227,
1247–51 (1979).
27. See Arlen, supra note 11, at 836–37; see also Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 692–94.
28. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-28.000; Arlen, supra note 6, at 151–53; Samuel W. Buell,
Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N.C. L. REV. 823, 832–36 (2018);

708

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:697

rule of respondeat superior with a de facto regime for sanctioning and
controlling corporate crime. This regime provides incentives for companies
to self-report and cooperate, by offering more favorable forms of resolution
and lower sanctions.29 Companies that self-report misconduct and fully
cooperate generally can expect to (1) resolve criminal matters without a
formal conviction through the use of DPAs or NPAs, (2) be subject to
reduced criminal fines, and (3) be less likely to be subject to mandatory
oversight in the form of a monitor or other intrusive internal reforms.30
Indeed, under current policy, in some circumstances companies that selfreport, fully cooperate, and remediate are presumed to be entitled to a
declination of prosecution.31 These guidelines embrace a model in which the
government uses the stick of severe corporate criminal sanctions, together
with the carrot of their partial or complete elimination, to extract information
from firms about either the existence of misconduct or the identity of
perpetrators and the nature of the evidence of their guilt.
U.S. prosecutors could maximize the incentive to self-report by
reserving avoidance of criminal conviction, through a DPA or NPA, for
companies that self-report as well as cooperate. Instead, they enable
companies to obtain a DPA or NPA in return for full cooperation alone
because enforcement officials derive substantial benefit from corporate
cooperation in investigating crime even in the absence of self-reporting. Full
credit for cooperation requires a firm to conduct a thorough and proactive
internal investigation, collect and preserve all documentary records
(especially overseas documents), disclose all relevant facts about individual
wrongdoing (including attribution of facts to identified sources), and “deconflict” and “make available” relevant witnesses over whom the
corporation may exercise control.
see also GARRETT, supra note 12, at 45–80 (discussing the history of the DOJ’s embrace of corporate
DPAs).
29. A large and maturing corporate criminal defense bar—comprised of many lawyers with federal
prosecution experience—has worked in coordination with enforcers to develop the de facto practice of
corporate enforcement. See BUELL, supra note 12, at 142–203; Brewster & Buell, supra note 9, at 210–
12; Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar
Practice in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1239–43 (2011).
30. See BUELL, supra note 12, at 116–19, 145–53; Arlen & Kahan, supra note 24, at 324–30.
31. Under the current policy, self-reporting, together with cooperation and remediation, can earn
corporations a declination (that is, exemption from prosecution)—provided that the firm does not have a
history of prior violations, otherwise demonstrates no “aggravating circumstances” relating to the offense
or the offender, and agrees to disgorgement of unlawful gains. If the firm does not obtain a declination, a
firm that undertakes these activities can qualify for a 50 percent reduction in the fine. JUSTICE MANUAL,
supra note 6, § 9-47.120. Although the DOJ originally adopted this policy for Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions, id., it later extended it to all actions by the Criminal Division. Rod J.
Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, Remarks at the 32nd Annual ABA National Institute on White
Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2018).
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The benefits of corporate cooperation are likely to be particularly large
under one or more of three conditions: (1) when prosecutors are in the early
stages of an investigation, before they have sufficient evidence of
individuals’ culpability to threaten individual liability as a means of
producing cooperating witnesses; (2) when employees and documents
relevant to the misconduct can be identified only after digesting large masses
of potentially relevant materials; and (3) when information is located
overseas and beyond the easy reach of U.S. legal procedures. The benefits of
using DPAs and NPAs—which, unlike formal conviction, typically do not
trigger potentially ruinous collateral consequences to corporations such as
debarment from an industry or line of business32—to encourage cooperation
are seen as outweighing the reduction in incentives to self-report that results
from offering access to DPA and NPAs to firms that merely cooperate after
government detection.
To be sure, there is skepticism about whether U.S. enforcement policy
is effectively calibrated to achieve its goals, and whether prosecutors have
pursued this model of corporate crime control with sufficient zeal.33 Many
have accused the DOJ of failing to follow through on the principal deterrence
benefits of this policy: the ability to use corporate cooperation to facilitate
prosecution of individual violators.34 Still, as measured by expansion of
corporate compliance programs,35 increase in corporate cooperation and selfreporting, and the numbers and size of U.S. enforcement matters resolved in
recent years, U.S. prosecutors appear, at least, to have benefitted from the
enhanced access to information about corporate misconduct that this system
has produced.
B. THE U.S. MODEL OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OVERSEAS
European and other nations have been adopting or expanding their
corporate criminal regimes and introducing DPA-like corporate resolutions.
This movement has been driven in part by growing concern over corruption
32. See Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational and
Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL
MISDEALING 87, 128–29, 134–38 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
33. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 12.
34. See sources cited supra note 12. Others have questioned the competence of prosecutors to
design and manage programs of corporate reform. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 24, at 375–85. See
generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE
CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (collecting the perspectives of 11 legal
scholars on issues relating to prosecutorial regulation of corporate conduct through criminal
enforcement).
35. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 990–91
(2009); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1003–04
(2017).
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of public officials in international business affairs and shifting norms about
bribery.36 It also is a response to the substantial sanctions imposed by U.S.
authorities on European and other global companies, as well as to efforts of
the OECD to combat under-enforcement against corrupt companies by
European and other nations.37 Especially since the global financial crisis,
European regulators have developed an increasing appreciation for the costs
of all corporate crime and the need to think about the problem of its control.38
Many countries are adopting corporate criminal liability or expanding
its scope. For example, in 2010, the United Kingdom enacted comprehensive
new anti-bribery legislation with both domestic and international
applications.39 This statutory scheme may prove broader than even the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), turning on arguably less
demanding mens rea requirements and extending its jurisdiction more
broadly. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 imposes respondeat superior-style
corporate criminal liability for all employee bribery (with the possibility of
an affirmative defense for compliance efforts), and even attaches individual
criminal liability to senior managers of firms who do not themselves commit
bribery but allow it to be committed with their “consent or connivance.”40
36. For comprehensive treatment of these developments, see DAVIS, supra note 17. According to
a recent OECD report, countries that bring corporate enforcement actions for foreign corruption tend to
use non-trial corporate criminal resolutions. RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL
RESOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 13–17.
37. Brewster & Buell, supra note 9, at 193–95; Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs
and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 409–11
(2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1776–84 (2011).
38. The United Kingdom has become a leader and partner with the United States in focusing on
financial sector crime, as shown in the multiple and coordinated prosecutions on both sides of the Atlantic
relating to the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) scandal. See Libor Cases, SERIOUS FRAUD
OFFICE, https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/libor-landing/ [https://perma.cc/H8CM-6MZS]; James McBride,
Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/35XB-6E5T]; Liam Vaughan & Gavin
Finch, Libor Scandal: The Bankers Who Fixed the World’s Most Important Number, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/18/libor-scandal-the-bankers-who-fixed-the-wor
lds-most-important-number [https://perma.cc/892K-M2L5]. Even Switzerland, with its participation in
the FIFA prosecutions and somewhat greater willingness to cooperate with efforts to overcome banking
secrecy, appears to be moving in a similar direction. See Luke Brown et al., Sepp Blatter Under Criminal
Investigation by Swiss Authorities Over ‘Disloyal Payment’ to Michel Platini — as It Happened,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/sepp-blatter/11891462/SeppBlatter-under-criminal-investigation-at-Fifa-live.html
[https://perma.cc/3FDW-4DFQ];
Swiss
Prosecutor Appeals for Cooperation on FIFA Case File, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://apnews.com/86eae88af7e54205ade703bd4dbf9efa/Swiss-prosecutor-appeals-for-cooperation-onFIFA-case-file [https://perma.cc/R9CT-KE73].
39. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK).
40. Id. §§ 7, 14; see also Liz Campbell, Corporate Liability and the Criminalisation of Failure, 12
LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. 57, 60–61 (2018); Jonathan J. Rusch, Section 7 of the United Kingdom
Bribery Act 2010: A “Fair Warning” Perlustration, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 25 (2017). In Ireland,
the Law Reform Commission has delivered a comprehensive report recommending a host of changes in
Irish law relating to corporate criminal liability and white-collar offenses. The report recommends
expansion of corporate criminal liability to hold firms responsible for most offenses that would be covered
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In 2016, the French parliament enacted Sapin II, an extensive new legal
regime governing bribery and anti-bribery enforcement.41 Sapin II imposes
administrative liability on companies that do not have a sufficient
anticorruption compliance program and criminal liability for influence
peddling (with extraterritorial application). It also creates a new anti-bribery
enforcement agency.
In addition, countries in Europe and elsewhere have adopted, or are
considering the introduction of, DPA-style corporate criminal settlements,
often with the explicit goals of encouraging corporate self-reporting and
cooperation, as well as settlement.42 For example, the U.K. Serious Fraud
Office (“SFO”) is now empowered to propose to courts negotiated DPAs
targeted at firms that self-report wrongdoing, fulfill obligations to assist
prosecutors, and improve compliance efforts. The SFO has issued written
guidance for corporations on how to obtain credit for assisting in
investigations.43 The French Sapin II legislation introduced a form of nonby U.S.-style respondeat superior liability if there were also a potential defense to liability for effective
corporate compliance. LAW REFORM COMM’N OF IR., REPORT: REGULATORY POWERS AND CORPORATE
OFFENCES 417–28 (2018), https://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Completed%20Projects/LRC%201192018%20Regulatory%20Powers%20and%20Corporate%20Offences%20Volume%201.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/74LW-AXG8]. The Commission also recommended the creation of a new “Corporate Crime
Agency.” Id. at 17–40.
41. Loi 2016-1691 du 9 Décembre 2016 Relative à la Transparence à la Lutte Contre la Corruption
et à la Modernisation de la Vie Économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 on Transparency in
the Fight Against Corruption and the Modernization of Economic Life], Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of the France], Dec. 10, 2016 (“Sapin II”). For a discussion of Sapin II,
see Arlen, supra note 10. In addition, Germany has gone from permitting corporations to treat overseas
bribes as a tax-deductible business expense to becoming a willing partner in the OECD effort to expand
anti-bribery enforcement. See OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, PHASE 3 REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN GERMANY 58–60 (2011), https://www.oecd.
org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Germanyphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TQJ-946
3]; Carter Dougherty, Prosecutions of Business Corruption Soar in Germany – Business – International
Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/business/worldbusin
ess/15iht-deutsch.4605942.html [https://perma.cc/8E83-YNLU]. Germany is entertaining the adoption of
corporate criminal liability, an idea once unthinkable in a system of criminal law predicated on moral
theory. See Rübenstahl & Brauns, supra note 10, at 871.
42. RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL RESOLUTIONS, supra note 10.
43. See, e.g., Serious Fraud Office v. Rolls-Royce PLC, Approved Judgment (Southwark Criminal
Court) (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/sfo-v-rolls-royce.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7YH-K54E] (judgment of Sir Brian Leveson in the Southwark Crown Court
approving deferred prosecution agreement); U.K. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE ET AL., supra note 15; SFO
OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK: CORPORATE CO-OPERATION GUIDANCE, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (2019),
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/sfo-operational-handbook/corporat
e-co-operation-guidance/?wpdmdl=24184&refresh=5ecae597ed26b1590355351 [https://perma.cc/4F63
-4FT9]; Deferred Prosecution Agreements, supra note 15. In the United Kingdom, resolution through a
DPA is subject to a form of judicial review that courts are not able to undertake in the United States. See
Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 192 (2016); Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest
in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1484–92 (2017).
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trial corporate criminal resolution akin to DPAs.44 Canada has introduced
DPAs for some offenses,45 as has Singapore.46 Efforts are underway in other
countries, including Australia, Switzerland, and Ireland, to permit the use of
DPA-style criminal settlements.47 In addition, the OECD is formulating
principles for corporate settlements in anti-bribery enforcement. These
developments are particularly striking in light of very different attitudes,
traditions, and institutional arrangements in Europe versus the United States
with respect to prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining.48
The exciting conversation about corporate crime control in Europe,
Asia, and elsewhere is extending into other important areas, such as legal
regimes affecting whistleblowers, regulatory systems governing corporate
disclosure, and individual liability for failures by corporate managers.
Given that these accelerating international developments originated in
the area of corporate liability and settlements, a pressing question for
jurisdictions pursuing enhanced deterrence of corporate crime is whether
they can increase the ability of prosecutors to detect and sanction corporate
misconduct by following U.S.-style approaches to liability and settlements.
As the remainder of this Article will explain, there is cause for skepticism.
The benefits to U.S. enforcement authorities of the U.S. system’s mix of
rewards for corporate self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation depends
greatly on doctrines and features of U.S. law unrelated to the law of corporate
criminal liability: the laws governing public and private investigations of
corporate misconduct. Thus, before one can further consider the impact of
adopting enforcement and settlement regimes that follow in the path of the
United States, one must understand the contrast between U.S. law governing
44. Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 (Fr.); First French DPAs for Corruption Offences
Concluded, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publicatio
ns/2018/03/first-french-dpas-for-corruption [https://perma.cc/XM8X-2G87]; see Arlen, supra note 10.
45. Milos Barutciski et al., Canada Now Has Deferred Prosecution Agreements, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 24. 2018), http://fcpaprofessor.com/canada-now-deferred-prosecution-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/X8NY-4SML]; see also Department of Justice Canada, Remediation Agreements and
Orders to Address Corporate Crime, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentjustice/news/2018/03/remediation-agreements-to-address-corporate-crime.html
[https://perma.cc/YW89-KPZW].
46. See Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Bill No. 14/2018) (Sing.). Chile and the Netherlands also
allow prosecutors to enter into DPA-like resolutions with corporations. See RESOLVING FOREIGN
BRIBERY CASES WITH NON-TRIAL RESOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 21, 49–50. Other countries permit
prosecutors to use some form of non-trial resolutions to pursue criminal or administrative cases against
corporations for corruption, including Brazil, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland. Id. at 21, 23, 27,
60; DAVIS, supra note 17, at 173.
47. Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) (Austl.); LAW
REFORM COMM’N OF IR., supra note 40, at 266–79; see also RESOLVING FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES WITH
NON-TRIAL RESOLUTIONS, supra note 10, at 34–35, 50.
48. See Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France,
Germany, and Italy: A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 22, 22–24 (2002).
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corporate investigations (explained in Part II) and the investigative laws of
other countries (explained in Part III).
II. THE LAW OF CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES
While policies regarding corporate criminal liability and settlements
determine the basic structure of corporate enforcement in the United States,
the value to prosecutors of the U.S. approach of rewarding corporate selfreporting and cooperation, described in Part I, depends on laws external to
enforcement policy. That value derives from how U.S. laws governing
evidence collection in the business context determine the relative abilities of
the government and private corporations to detect and investigate corporate
crime. In the United States, doctrines relating to self-incrimination,
employee rights during questioning, data privacy, and legal privileges—that
is the laws governing corporate investigations—combine to place firms in a
superior position to the government when seeking to acquire evidence of
misconduct, particularly at the early stages of an investigation.
This Part advances the literature on corporate crime by demonstrating
the essential role of evidentiary and procedural laws in the process of
threatening corporations with criminal liability in order to uncover and prove
misconduct within firms. This Part also sets the stage for this Article’s
discussion, in Parts III and IV, of how differences in investigative law in
other countries mean that, when evaluating whether to follow the U.S.
approach to both the scope of liability and negotiated settlements, other
jurisdictions cannot expect to obtain equivalent benefits from corporate
policing without substantial changes to enforcement policies and institutions.
A. INVESTIGATIONS OF CORPORATE CRIME
A brief description of the current shape of corporate investigations in
the United States will set the stage for the doctrinal discussion that follows.
When the Justice Department sanctions large multinational firms, the
resulting settlement or conviction most often relates to an investigation in
one of a few areas: foreign commercial bribery, large-scale fraud such as
accounting or consumer fraud, fraud on the government (especially with
regard to health care programs or defense contracts), and harm to consumers
and the environment through corporations’ products and industrial
activities.49
49. The statutes and regulations available to U.S. prosecutors to sanction these activities are, for
practical purposes, countless and thus far less influential in determining the course of investigation of
corporate crime than many public or foreign observers might think.
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A first, and critical, investigative step is how a firm or a prosecutor
learns about a potential criminal matter. The most common methods of initial
detection are through a firm’s compliance systems (for example, internal
reporting by employees, data analytics, or other monitoring systems), or, in
the case of government detection, a whistleblower report, investigative
journalism, disclosure by a cooperating defendant implicated in other
misconduct, or, less commonly, detection by regulators.50
Following detection, preliminary investigation is pursued by the firm,
public enforcers, or both. At this initial stage, the first objective is to
determine whether misconduct occurred and, if so, to assess the scope of the
wrongdoing and associated legal risks, especially the identities of implicated
managers and employees. The company will do this by examining internal
documents (including employees’ electronic communications) and
interviewing employees. If the government is not yet aware of the
wrongdoing, an urgent question for the firm is whether to report its findings
to enforcers or attempt to remediate and then remain silent.
For prosecutors, the initial task is to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence of misconduct to investigate at all, and, if so, what should
be the scope of, and resources devoted to, the investigation. They then need
to determine whom to interview. This requires identifying non-implicated
employees with relevant information because prosecutors often do not have
sufficient evidence of misconduct at the early stage to pressure implicated
witnesses to cooperate. Initial interviews also enable enforcement authorities
to determine what documentary and electronic evidence to seek.
By the time the nature of the wrongdoing and the rough scope of
personnel involved have become clear, the corporation will almost always
have retained outside counsel. These private lawyers will conduct witness
interviews and data recovery and review on behalf of the company, often
with the assistance of other professionals such as forensic accountants. The
corporation will also have hired separate counsel to represent many of its
employees, especially those who might be implicated in the wrongdoing. At
this stage in a government investigation, prosecutors may seek to enter into
cooperation deals with ancillary implicated employees.
The firm and the government will then move to a phase in which the
company’s primary objective is to obtain a favorable resolution, and the
50. An analysis of corporate fraud indicates that government investigators tend to learn about
misconduct from people within the firm, as opposed to through their own monitoring. Alexander Dyck et
al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010). Public enforcement
detects only a small amount of the corporate misconduct that occurs, however. Companies’ internal
systems detect, and are able to substantiate, more crime. See Eugene Soltes, The Frequency of Corporate
Misconduct: Public Enforcement Versus Private Reality, 26 J. FIN. CRIME 923, 923–25 (2019).
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government’s primary objective is to gather complete and legally admissible
evidence of the wrongdoing, both documentary and testimonial. This stage,
which often continues past the point of settlement between the corporation
and prosecutors, commonly involves private and public lawyers and their
agents conducting interviews, data analysis, document review, and
sometimes grand jury testimony, all while regularly communicating with
each other about the course and findings of the investigation. Settlement
negotiations commonly occur during this period. The company will
understand that prosecutors will consider the quality of the firm’s
cooperation when determining the recommended form of settlement (that is
DPA, NPA, or plea) and magnitude of sanction.
Before and after any settlement, the firm also will implement internal
reforms either voluntarily or as mandated by settlement agreement. Reforms
typically will include changes to personnel and sometimes governance
systems, improvements to the corporation’s compliance programs, and
submission to oversight by an independent monitor.51 These activities can
lead to the detection, and potentially the disclosure of, evidence of further
detected wrongdoing.
B. ACCESS TO EMPLOYEES’ STATEMENTS AND TESTIMONY
At each stage of a corporate investigation, witnesses can be essential to
identifying and proving a criminal violation. Documents and other forensic
materials can be decisive. But their probative power, especially for complex
business crimes, often depends on the explanatory testimony of persons who
can identify the material documents and explain their meaning. As this
Section shows, U.S. criminal procedure and employment law combine to
give private corporations distinct advantages relative to public prosecutors
in obtaining testimonial evidence from employees, especially at the early
stage of an investigation.52
51. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 24, at 335–36.
52. As stated previously, this Article sets aside for later work comparative analysis of legal
doctrines protecting employees against termination if they blow the whistle on misconduct internally or
externally, as well as of legal regimes that provide bounties to external whistleblowers. See supra note
18. Protections for internal whistleblowers in both federal and state law, see, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND,
REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 75–88, 132–35, 142–
45 (2010), can enhance firms’ ability to detect and investigate by generating more information about
misconduct from employees. While overseas there are less-developed laws protecting whistleblowers
from retaliation, in many countries employees are protected by stronger employment laws preventing
termination without cause. See infra Part III. The United States is one of the few countries that offers
bounties for some crimes. Such bounties potentially enhance both the government’s ability to detect
misconduct and corporations’ incentives to self-report it. Arlen, supra note 10. Bounties do not obviate,
or even significantly reduce the benefit to the government of inducing corporate self-reporting or
cooperation. Bounties are not available for most crimes. Moreover, for misconduct for which they are
available, the government appears not to obtain actionable whistleblowing reports relating to most of the
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1. Prosecutors’ Ability to Obtain Information from Employees: Fifth
Amendment, Immunity, and Right to Counsel
Corporate personnel with knowledge of wrongdoing within a firm were
often involved in the misconduct and thus have potential exposure to
prosecution.53 Given the factual and doctrinal complexity of most whitecollar crimes, and the extremely broad scope of American prosecutorial
discretion, employees close to the misconduct will, at the beginning of a
criminal inquiry, have at least reasonable apprehension of potential charges.
The U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantees all such
employees a right against self-incrimination, erecting a barrier to
prosecutors’ acquiring their evidence.54 The core guarantee is that the
government may not prove a person’s guilt in a criminal trial by offering in
evidence verbal or written statements of that person that were compelled by
government action.55 A subpoena, of course, is deemed compulsory because
the law of civil and criminal contempt provides for sanctions, including
imprisonment, against a witness who refuses to obey a subpoena’s
commands.56 Therefore, an individual who reasonably fears selfincrimination, even indirectly, has a right to invoke the Fifth Amendment as
grounds for refusing to testify in a grand jury, courtroom, or other proceeding
that is subject to contempt sanctions.57 And, of course, any person may
decline a request to appear voluntarily for an interview with government
investigators without needing to expressly invoke constitutional privilege.
One might think that prosecutors could rely on compelling the
testimony of witnesses who have no reasonable fear of self-incrimination,
and thus no right to assert, because they have no potential criminal liability.
This route is not promising in the context of corporate crimes for two
reasons. First, such crimes are rarely provable without the testimony of those
who were themselves involved in illegal activity, because violators tend to
misconduct that occurs, or even that it enforces. Thus, even with some available bounties, corporations
in the United States have a comparative advantage in detecting and investigating misconduct.
53. See Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2215, 2234–67 (2017).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972); Lisa
Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J. 697, 705 (2016).
55. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
430 (1956).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (2018); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838–39
(1994). Miranda doctrine is rarely at issue in the investigation of corporate crime in the United States
because questioning in police custody of corporate suspects is so uncommon. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). Unlike some nations, the United States does not permit even temporary arrest solely for
investigative purposes. See id. at 482. The Supreme Court, in spite of the opportunity to do so, has
declined to rule that questioning before a grand jury constitutes custodial interrogation. United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977).
57. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597–601 (1896).
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keep wrongdoing secret from those who are not members of criminal
conspiracies.58 Second, law and courts take a deferential posture towards an
individual’s assertion that she reasonably fears, ex ante, that answering an
investigative question might further her later prosecution.59 Even peripheral
witnesses, when well advised by counsel, are apt to resist government
questioning on Fifth Amendment grounds, especially early in an
investigation when neither prosecutors nor defense counsel can confidently
predict who, if anyone, will be implicated in wrongdoing.
Another option for prosecutors is to attempt to build a case on the
testimony of occasional uncounseled individuals who voluntarily waive their
Fifth Amendment right and submit to investigative questioning. Less well
advised or informed employees, those keen on currying favor with
employers, and those with strong appetite for legal risks might choose to
answer questions freely. However, the opportunity to surprise and deal
directly with an unrepresented person, prized by any government
investigator, is rare in major corporate criminal investigations. Firms
typically already know about the potential wrongdoing and, as discussed
below, have either had the firm’s counsel contact employees before the
government commences investigative activities, or have hired individual
counsel for employees.
State rules of attorney conduct, which bind federal prosecutors,60
prohibit prosecutors and their agents from contacting individuals who are
known to be represented by counsel without counsel present, even during the
earliest stages of a criminal investigation before any person has been
charged.61 These rules can particularly inhibit corporate investigations
because most states interpret them as applying, when a company is
represented by counsel, to contacts with senior personnel of the company;
some states find them to apply to contacts with lower-level employees and
even, if privileged information is sought, to contacts with former
employees.62
58. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1980).
59. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485–87 (1951); Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281,
287–90 (6th Cir. 2005). Prosecutors generally eschew the onerous and often fruitless task of litigating
whether a particular witness may assert the right to silence, especially during the investigative stage of a
matter.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2018).
61. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1988); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964)
(explaining the Sixth Amendment dimension to government contacts with charged defendants
represented by counsel).
62. See, e.g., Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 628–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp., 654 N.Y.S.2d 240, 254–55 (Sup. Ct. 1996); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 296 (2005) [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL]
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A prosecutor seeking evidence from an informed individual represented
by counsel must thus obtain a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right, which
will come at a price. This price will vary, of course, according to the parties’
bargaining strength. At the early stages of a corporate investigation, when
the government has not yet gathered enough evidence to determine whether
a crime has been committed, much less which employees might have been
involved, an implicated individual has little to fear from the government if
she does not cooperate and thus little reason to waive her right to silence.
To obtain information from informed, savvy witnesses who assert their
rights, prosecutors must often deploy a costly measure: the statutory
procedure for immunizing witnesses in order to obtain evidence in the face
of the Fifth Amendment right. For statutory immunity to comply with
constitutional requirements, it must fully “supplant” the Fifth Amendment
right, that is, place the immunized witness in no worse position than if she
had remained silent.63 Therefore, testimony compelled under such
immunity—known as “derivative use” or “Kastigar” immunity—may not be
used against a witness in any manner, even indirectly as a lead to acquiring
evidence. Functionally, this means that later prosecution of an immunized
witness will be extremely difficult or even impossible.64
At later stages of a corporate investigation, the government may be able
to extract a waiver of the right to self-incrimination as part of a guilty plea
that exchanges testimony for a reduced sentence or more limited form of
immunity protection, but only if the government has solved the problem of
how to assemble sufficient proof of wrongdoing in the early stages, when
witnesses lacked strong incentives to cooperate. Thus, if the government
were to act alone, the Fifth Amendment—together with the pervasive and
early presence of private counsel—would impose costly impediments to the
investigation of corporate crime that could disable an investigation at the
(summarizing uneven state of the law and advising federal prosecutors to study local law before acting).
63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6005 (2018); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1972);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
North, 920 F.2d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973);
see also Stephen D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1309, 1321–27 (2001). For this reason, Justice Department guidelines disfavor grants of statutory
immunity. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-23.000. It is rare that a prosecutor will be willing to apply
to a court for immunity without first having obtained a “proffer” from the witness. The proffer process
requires the witness to be willing to effectively give up any prospect of testifying in her own defense, or
otherwise putting on a defense case, by previewing her testimony for the government in exchange for a
limited form of “use immunity” that guarantees only that the government will not use her proffer
statements as evidence in its case-in-chief. See SAMPLE PROFFER AGREEMENT, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (May 17, 2005), http://inns.innsofcourt.org/media/66
719/2%20-%20SDNY%20Proffer.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B7D-GQ5R]; see also United States v. Velez,
354 F.3d 190, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2004).
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threshold.
2. Corporations’ Ability to Obtain Information from Employees: State
Action and Employment Law
The U.S. Constitution does not constrain non-governmental actors. As
a result, corporations do not face similar restrictions when obtaining
testimonial evidence from potentially implicated employees. Private
corporations interacting with their own employees generally are not official
actors under U.S. constitutional law, even when investigating in anticipation
of cooperating with the government in the future.65 Thus, private
corporations can compel their employees to speak to representatives of the
firm tasked with determining whether and where misconduct has occurred.66
If an employee refuses to answer, the firm may lawfully terminate, demote,
or reduce the compensation of the employee—and thus may obtain employee
cooperation by credibly threatening to take such measures.67
In addition, employees do not have a constitutional right to counsel
during such interviews.68 Employees of private corporations in the United
States, the vast majority of whom do not have union representation, generally
work under the terms of at-will employment, meaning the employer can
summarily fire the employee, without notice or an opportunity to be heard,
as long as the firm does not act in violation of other laws, such as statutory
prohibitions on discrimination.69 Even senior managers working under
protective employment contracts, or union members working under
collective bargaining agreements, usually may be terminated “for cause,” a
condition that, in the United States, is likely met by a manager’s refusal to
obey a directive to cooperate with a firm’s investigation.70
65. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350–58 (1974); Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc.,
625 F.2d 379, 384–85 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (relating
to government military contractor operating overseas).
66. See Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 826 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2016).
67. Id. at 69.
68. See D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 871–72 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335,
337–38 (2d Cir. 1970). The small percentage of private-sector workers who are represented by unions do
have a statutory right to the presence of a union representative if the employee might be subject to
discipline as a result of the interview. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1975); see
also ROBERT A GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW: ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY § 16.4
(2013).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2014); see Samuel
Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 347 (2014).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW §§ 2.02, 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2014); see also
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Forming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 24–25
(2010); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405–06 (1967).
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Prosecutors who obtain the fruits of such questioning from a
cooperating corporation are free to use them as they please, including as
evidence in court, even though, as matter of colloquial understanding, such
statements have been coerced by the firm’s threat of action against
employees who remain silent.71 As long as the corporation directs its own
investigation, without being directed by prosecutors, the investigation will
not be deemed to constitute state action, even if the government benefits in
the end, thus leaving affected individuals without viable Fifth Amendment
objections.72
To summarize, U.S. prosecutors face substantial practical and legal
hurdles to obtaining individual testimony in the investigation of corporate
crime, particularly at the initial stages of determining whether a crime has
been committed and who may be implicated. Firms encounter much lower
hurdles to obtaining the statements of their own employees. Thus,
prosecutors have powerful legal and practical incentives to induce firms to
acquire witness testimony in exchange for leniency in corporate sanctioning.
C. THE LAW OF LAWYERS: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND JOINT
DEFENSE
Firms’ comparative advantage in obtaining evidence during corporate
investigations in the United States depends on another area outside corporate
criminal law: rules governing attorney-client privilege and the freedom of
corporations to hire counsel for their employees and share investigative
information with such lawyers.
Firms are reluctant to work proactively to detect and fully investigate
misconduct unless they can control access to the fruits of such efforts. Firms
have an incentive to expend resources on investigating when they can benefit
from sharing products with enforcers and among defense counsel, while both
retaining control over how much is shared and shielding those products from
adversarial third parties who would seek to exploit them in costly private
71. See United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443–44 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 169–71 (1986); Griffin, supra note 18.
72. Judges have concluded that a specific private investigation constituted state action when
prosecutors exerted undue influence over the firm’s investigation. E.g., United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d
130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Connolly, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76233, at *33–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). In Stein, the court found that prosecutors had fully
entwined themselves in the conduct of the firm by explicitly threatening the firm (KPMG, which was a
partnership in the reputationally sensitive auditing business) with a disabling criminal conviction if it did
not follow prosecutors’ directives, including instructions about precisely what the firm should say to its
employees to induce them to talk to the government, including without counsel. See generally Stein, 435
F. Supp. 2d 330. The court in Connolly likewise found that the government directed specific investigative
measures, including individual interviews, while failing to conduct meaningful investigation of its own.
Connolly, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *31–46.
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litigation. U.S. law on legal privileges and related matters gives firms
substantial and early control over information gathered in corporate
investigations, thereby enhancing private firms’ investigative powers.
1. Counsel for the Firm: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Protection
The American attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure all
confidential communications between client and lawyer made for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice of any sort: transactional (such as for
mergers and acquisitions), litigation-related (whether during or in
anticipation of legal action), and even general advice unrelated to a specific
deal or dispute, such as ongoing compliance advice.73 Corporate clients
enjoy the privilege just as individuals do.74 Moreover, the U.S. corporate
privilege applies both to in-house lawyers and outside counsel when acting
as legal representatives for the firm.75 Corporations and their counsel also
enjoy the protection of the work product doctrine, a qualified protection
shielding materials, such as notes of interviews, prepared in anticipation of
litigation and reflecting the mental processes of counsel.76
Under the Supreme Court’s foundational decision in Upjohn v. United
States, when lawyers acting on behalf of a firm interview employees about
actions undertaken in the scope of employment, the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine protect the resulting information regardless of
whether a lawyer speaks with the most senior manager or the lowest-level
employee.77 Thus, corporate counsel can conduct internal investigations of
wrongdoing knowing, and assuring employees, that the privilege will shelter
interviews as long as one of the significant purposes of the investigation is
to provide legal advice to the firm.78
This doctrine assists corporate investigations in two ways. First,
corporations can more freely investigate and respond to misconduct of which
the government is unaware because they can control whether and what
information is disclosed. Second, it may lead employees to speak more
frankly. The privilege belongs to the corporation, not the employee, and is
the corporation’s to assert or waive, at the discretion of corporate
73. See INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 25–91 (Brad D. Brian et al. eds., 4th ed. 2017).
74. See id.
75. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981).
76. Id. at 397–402.
77. Id. at 392–96.
78. See, e.g., In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137, 140–41 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In re
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also In re GM LLC Ignition
Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 529–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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management. However, a corporate lawyer’s standard “Upjohn warning”79
informs an interviewed employee that the conversation is privileged. (A
complete Upjohn warning should also explain to the employee that the
corporation, not the employee, has the power to choose to waive that
protection.80) Having been told that a conversation with counsel is
confidential, some employees may believe it will remain so, and thus may
be more willing to disclose wrongdoing in the hope of retaining employment
or at least being allowed to exit on favorable terms.
Companies seeking to cooperate can do so either by waiving the
privilege and providing the government with raw investigative materials
gathered by corporate counsel, or by giving the government summaries of
the facts of the misconduct.81 U.S. companies tend not to supply such raw
material because, in the United States, disclosure to one party causes general
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, leaving investigative products
exposed to private plaintiffs, regulators, and others.82 However, even factual
summaries are required to be quite detailed and include facts identifying
relevant witnesses and culpable actions by specific individuals. Firms are
also asked to provide the government with a roadmap showing where it can
79. United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997).
80. Id.; see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations:
Achieving Fairness for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 100 (2013). Practitioners differ about
whether corporate counsel also should caution an employee to obtain her own attorney and advise her
that the corporation may agree to cooperate with the government and share the fruits of its investigation,
to the legal detriment of the employee. See INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 73, at
43–45. Employees must pass a high hurdle to establish a personal privilege with respect to conversations
with counsel for the employer. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120,
123 (3d Cir. 1986). Bar rules have been interpreted to permit corporate counsel to simultaneously provide
legal advice to both the firm and its employees, at least at the early stages of an investigation when counsel
is seeking to determine whether wrongdoing has likely occurred and a full internal investigation is
warranted. See N.Y. City Lawyers’ Ass’n. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 747 (2014).
81. Companies’ leverage has been enhanced since the DOJ changed its policy—largely due to
lobbying by the bar and business sector—to discourage prosecutors from insisting on a waiver of legal
privilege in return for giving cooperation credit, but to allow companies to offer to waive. Memorandum
from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S.
Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/
legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf; see Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M. Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts
a Policy in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/
29/business/29kpmg.html [https://perma.cc/3DFB-5797]. For full treatment of these developments and
their importance to firms’ bargaining position, see Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver
Policy Threaten the Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A
Preliminary “No,” 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237 (2008).
82. See, e.g., In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Qwest
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Phillipines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1417 (3d Cir. 1991). But see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596, 598 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (stating that voluntary disclosure of privileged materials to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) does not waive the attorney-client privilege as to civil
plaintiffs). Rule-makers have adopted limited waiver protections, such as for accidental disclosure. See
FED. R. EVID. 502.
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obtain the evidence needed to prove a case.83 To date, this approach to
cooperation has been reasonably successful in maintaining confidentiality
vis-à-vis third parties.84
2. Counsel for the Employees: Funding and Conflicts of Interest
The relative advantage of firms in the United States gathering
information during investigations is enhanced by principles that allow
corporations to retain lawyers for individual employees and share
information among corporate and individual counsel. Firms’ control of
counsel makes it more likely that employees will cooperate with firms’
efforts to gather facts because refusal to cooperate generally results in not
only termination but also loss of firm-funded representation. Further,
employees provided with counsel may be more likely to assert their rights if
prosecutors attempt to compel their statements.
U.S. firms have wide latitude to hire counsel for employees for two
reasons. First, attorney ethics regimes allow the conflict of interest inherent
in such arrangements to be waived by the individuals, who often are
motivated to do so to avoid legal expenses.85 Second, corporate law
facilitates the funding by firms of attorneys for officers, managers, and
employees in investigative and enforcement matters.86 Almost all large U.S.
corporations have a settled practice of paying employees’ legal fees in workrelated investigative and regulatory matters.87
In addition, rules allowing coordination among corporate and individual
counsel give corporations greater access to information about the progress
83. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-28.720. It remains unclear whether corporations can share
even summaries of information gathered by lawyers through interviews of corporate personnel—
including identification, as the government expects, of relevant witnesses—without waiving the privilege.
84. Cf. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Herrera, 324 F.R.D. 258, 258 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (reporting the
ruling of a single magistrate judge that protection was waived as to some internal investigation fruits due
to “oral downloads” of the content of employee interviews to SEC personnel).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2019). See generally TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH,
ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION (2010) (exploring how corporate insurance and indemnification practices and arguing that
such practices weaken deterrence of wrongdoing in the corporate setting).
87. One court concluded that employees of the KPMG auditing firm had a reasonable expectation
that the firm would cover their fees based on the firm’s past practices (and its own statements), even
though they were not contractually entitled to fee advancement. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130,
155–58 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Debates Who Should Pay Legal Bills, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 12, 2013, 8:50 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/wall-st-debateswho-should-pay-legal-bills/ [https://perma.cc/CT9C-8AP4]. “Clawback” actions to recoup fees from
employees later convicted of crimes are burdensome and relatively rare. See Peter J. Henning, When
Legal Bills Become a Cause for Dispute, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 1, 2010, 9:11 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/when-legal-bills-become-an-item-of-dispute/ [https://perma.c
c/ZZL6-GLCM].
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and direction of the government’s investigation. This stems from U.S. law
on the joint defense privilege, which underlies the common practice of joint
defense agreements.88 This doctrine operates as an exception to the ordinary
rules governing waiver of the attorney-client privilege. If multiple parties to
an actual or potential legal proceeding share a common legal interest and
clearly invoke the joint defense privilege, sharing of privileged materials
among such persons and their counsel will not waive the attorney-client
privilege.89
The practice of information sharing under joint defense agreements can
greatly enhance corporate counsel’s (and thus management’s) ability to
know what the evidence is in a complex matter, what parts of that evidence
are known to the government, and even what the government’s actions
suggest about which persons and crimes it may be targeting. If a firm both
is paying the fees of individual counsel and is party to joint defense
agreements with those counsel, even the most careful counsel inevitably will
have incentives, including potential benefits to their own clients, to exchange
information about the progress and direction of the government’s
investigation with the firm and among individual counsel.
The more a corporation’s employees submit to questioning, and the
more the corporation knows about both its own employees’ and the
government’s knowledge of the facts, the better positioned the corporation
will be to craft a cooperation strategy that will satisfy prosecutors and earn
the firm the sanction reductions it seeks.
D. CORPORATE DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS
Corporate crime is also investigated and proved through very large
quantities of documents. With digitization, it is now routine for major
corporate investigations to involve millions of documentary records, within
which items of critical proof can be scattered or buried. Although U.S.
authorities can obtain documents by subpoena, firms retain a comparative
advantage in the very costly enterprise of collecting and assessing
documentary evidence in major cases of corporate crime.90 Whereas
88. See INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 73, at 179–84.
89. See id.
90. See Arlen, supra note 6, at 165–67 (discussing companies’ comparative advantage at obtaining
and analyzing information about conduct by their employees in the scope of employment); see also JAY
E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, III, EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE (1st ed. 2005) (discussing
how lawyers can handle electronically stored information); INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS,
supra note 73, at 134; MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND
DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW (1st ed., 2004); Roger Parloff, How VW Paid $25
Billion for ‘Dieselgate’ — And Got Off Easy, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 2018, 2:01 AM), https://fortune.com/201
8/02/06/volkswagen-vw-emissions-scandal-penalties/ [https://perma.cc/4YBL-AE9T].
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prosecutors cannot expend the resources that would be required to blindly
subpoena records whenever a hunch about misconduct has arisen, companies
in the United States can monitor electronic communications and documents
to detect misconduct.
Moreover, when investigating crime, companies are better able to
identify, collect, and assess vast amounts of potentially relevant information.
Corporate records are routinely spread across many locations and housed in
multiple jurisdictions. The collection and review of documentary evidence
presents government enforcers with severe practical problems. The ability of
firms to assist the government in reducing those problems, and thus to speed
corporate investigations, and lower their costs, enhances prosecutors’ ability
to learn of and prove misconduct.
1. Government Access to Documentary Evidence
The legal mechanism for compelling production of documents in a U.S.
criminal investigation is the grand jury subpoena or, in regulatory matters
such as Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) investigations, an administrative subpoena authorized by
statute.91 A grand jury subpoena satisfies the Constitution as long as it is not
overly burdensome or broad, and there is a reasonable possibility that the
materials obtained will be relevant, even if only indirectly.92 Corporations
have no right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. As a
result, an employee subpoenaed to provide corporate documents in her
official capacity cannot resist, even if the material could be personally
incriminating.93
However, in order to determine which documents to seek and to
understand them, investigators need to undertake preliminary work,
generally by interviewing witnesses. Corporations have a large advantage in
this endeavor, as discussed above. Moreover, even when prosecutors know
the broad category of records they need, they often cannot effectively obtain
the information without the corporation’s help. A subpoena at the outset of
an investigation for all records relating to a line of business will elicit a far
greater volume of evidence than the government can manage with its own
resources.94 Uncooperative corporations have room to drag their heels in
91. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2018).
92. As a matter of doctrine, a grand jury may issue a subpoena “just because it wants assurance”
that no crime has been committed. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991); United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950).
93. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73–75 (1906); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
405–14 (1976); Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Fifth Amendment and the Grand Jury, 22 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 6–7 (2007).
94. A subpoena that sweeping could prompt litigation on the ground that it exceeds even the wide
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complying, leading to delay in addition to the government being buried in
documents.95
In corporate investigations that cross international borders, the
government faces legal obstacles in addition to these practical problems. A
grand jury subpoena is not self-executing outside United States territory. An
American court may not issue a warrant to search premises abroad, although
electronic evidence stored abroad by United States entities may be
searchable.96 Production of foreign documents can be ordered only with
cumbersome procedures provided through mutual legal assistance treaties.97
Given the volume, complexity, and dispersion of data in any investigation of
crime within a large global corporation, prosecutors acting alone could not
get to the bottom of a matter in reasonable time, at least not with current
resources.
2. Corporate Access to and Capacity to Evaluate Documentary Evidence
A cooperative corporation can reduce these problems for government
investigators. Corporations in the United States generally have the right to
access work-related electronic evidence, including employees’ emails, on
servers or company-owned computers, even when this information contains
employees’ personal data.98 As a result, corporations can better detect
latitude given to investigative subpoenas because the directive is overbroad, would be excessively
burdensome to comply with, and likely covers material subject to attorney-client privilege. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 17; Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401 (1998).
95. Criminal investigators of course have the alternative of proceeding by search warrant. But this
requires having evidence in hand sufficient to establish probable cause and, because most documentary
evidence is digital, will result in the same problem of overbreadth: the government will end up with reams
of data. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/file
s/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6BL-AV9H ] (explaining the
difficulty in obtaining and navigating computer evidence).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018); Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, Pub. L. No. 115141, §103, 132 Stat. 348 (2018); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018)
(declining to rule on the issue of access to communications stored abroad following Congress’s enactment
of new legislation granting access).
97. E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Ger.-U.S., art. 11, Oct. 14, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
108–27; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.K.-U.S., art. 14, Jan. 6, 1994, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 104–2; see also JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-13.512; CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL, supra note 62, §§ 266–283; SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:4 (2d ed. 2019).
98. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 5-4–5-255 (5th ed.
2018). For example, under federal law, companies may seize and access the contents of company laptops
provided to employees and can monitor employees’ work-related communications in the ordinary course
of business by notifying employees that their electronic communications are being monitored. Id. at 586. Employers also can access electronic information, including emails, stored on their own systems.
Courts have concluded employees do not have privacy rights over work-related materials when the
employer clearly reserved the right of access. Employees also cannot claim privacy interests in workrelated emails. Id. at 5-110; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND
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misconduct in the first instance by routine monitoring of employees’ emails,
data storage facilities, and other electronic evidence. A company with an
effective compliance program is likely to have signposts to guide it—
transactions flagged by compliance mechanisms or internal whistleblowing
reports.99
In addition, companies are better able to exploit documents in
investigating suspected misconduct because they can use their
knowledgeable employees, and the ability to compel their assistance, to
identify problematic conduct and relevant documentary records. A large
corporation also can use its systems of data management, which may be more
powerful and sophisticated than those available to prosecutors and
government investigators. Moreover, large corporations have assets to retain
outside vendors, such as data management and law firms, to assist in
electronic discovery through technical expertise and supplying of personnel
for manual document review.
Finally, some documents useful to investigators may be shielded by the
firm’s attorney-client privilege. Corporations routinely need the penmanship
and opinions of counsel to conduct deals and, given the prevalence of
litigation, have a strong incentive to include lawyers in internal discussions
in order to invoke the shield of the privilege.100 Firms can freely access these
materials in the course of determining whether misconduct occurred. In
situations where prosecutors need access to such records to make their case,
firms are free to waive privilege and provide the documents.101
In short, U.S. firms own their own records and can choose to access,
organize and share them as they please. Given the volume and complexity of
documentary records in large modern corporations, this power and control is
of tremendous value to the government in detecting and proving corporate
crime.
MATERIALS ON TORTS 1048 (12th ed. 2020). California’s new privacy law could alter this for residents
of California, but at present it appears not applicable to an employer’s employees. AB-25, California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Assembly Bill No. 25 (providing a temporary exemption from the CCPA
for information collected about employees by employers, with the exception of the private civil action
provision and the obligation to provide notice about the categories of personal information to be
collected), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB25.
99. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 752–54.
100. Moreover, firms negotiating with the government over corporate criminal liability sometimes
rely on arguments that the advice of counsel contemporaneous with transactions negates liability by
providing defenses of “good faith reliance” and the like. See Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law
Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611, 639–41 (2011).
101. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-28.710.
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III. THE LAW OF CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS OVERSEAS
In the United States, structuring corporate enforcement policy to
substantially reward self-reporting and cooperation can enhance
enforcement because corporations in the United States enjoy superior and
less costly access to information than do enforcement authorities, not only
due to superior resources, but also because of U.S. law governing corporate
investigations.102 Seeking similar benefits, other countries are adopting, or
considering, laws that expand corporate criminal liability and allow
negotiated corporate criminal resolutions, such as DPAs, in part to promote
corporate cooperation and self-reporting.103 Debates over such laws have
tended to overlook that such reforms, including the conditions for sanction
mitigation, cannot be fully evaluated without accounting for how local laws
governing the conduct of corporate investigations determine corporations’
and government authorities’ relative abilities to detect and investigate
misconduct.
This Part shows that, in many other countries, differences in laws
governing self-incrimination, employment, legal privileges, and data privacy
restrict corporate investigations or strengthen government investigations
relative to U.S. law of corporate investigations, thereby impacting the likely
effect and optimal structure of reforms. To demonstrate this, this Article
focuses on material differences in investigative laws across jurisdictions that
could lead to different enforcement outcomes even if countries’ adopted
respondeat superior liability for firms and negotiated settlements short of
conviction (such as DPAs).104 The objective is to illustrate the importance
and prevalence of such differences in many jurisdictions, rather than to
provide complete comparative analysis of the laws and institutions of any
single country.105
102. Corporate cooperation would help prosecutors detect and sanction misconduct even if
companies do not enjoy a comparative advantage in detecting misconduct, provided that corporations are
able to devote more resources to investigations. In these conditions, a preferable response would be to
increase funding for government authorities. But in this Article we are largely taking existing political
economy arrangements as given, at least within reasonable bounds.
103. For a discussion of how the United States’ success in corporate criminal enforcement has
influenced reforms in other countries, both directly and through the OECD, see DAVIS, supra note 17;
Arlen, supra note 10; Brewster & Buell, supra note 9, at 198 .
104. Given our focus on laws that would impact corporate investigations were a country to adopt
respondeat superior and DPA-like negotiated settlements, we do not consider legal differences that arise
when a country does not permit negotiated corporate criminal settlements. For a discussion of these
differences see, for example, Arlen, supra note 10 (discussing France and the United Kingdom); Diskant,
supra note 18 (discussing the United States and Germany).
105. A full comparison of the laws of the U.S. and another country would necessarily incorporate a
host of other laws and institutions, including those affecting prosecutorial discretion, the public evidence
gathering process, collateral consequences, the availability of private class actions, effectiveness of
sanctions imposed by civil and administrative enforcement, the range of white collar offenses and the
degree of extraterritorial enforcement, the magnitude of corporate criminal fines, the funding of
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To be sure, it is exceptionally difficult to predict the effects of deploying
in one jurisdiction legal doctrines and policies that have been pursued in
another.106 Institutional arrangements, legal and cultural norms, and
differing political economies can have equal or greater effects than laws and
government policies. The interaction effects of the plethora of relevant laws
and institutions can be too complicated for any theoretical or empirical
model to fully accommodate. Nonetheless, policymakers throughout Europe,
in areas of the Pacific Rim, and elsewhere have taken a keen interest in the
model of corporate criminal enforcement that has developed in the United
States over the last two decades. That interest starts with the intuition that
broadening corporate criminal liability and adopting laws and policies that
reward corporations for assisting in public enforcement will yield social
welfare benefits. This Part shows that further pursuit of this intuition will
require confronting the serious potential effects of fundamental differences
in legal doctrine governing public and private efforts to investigate corporate
crime.
A. PROSECUTORS’ INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
Prosecutors in many other countries have more latitude than their U.S.
counterparts to compel or pressure potentially implicated people to answer
questions. They also often can use evidence derived from interrogations that
violated a suspect’s rights.
Some legal systems, particularly those in Asia, do not grant implicated
persons a right to silence at all.107 In other countries, the right to silence is
weaker than in the United States. For example, French investigators can
make it costly for implicated employees to remain silent by threatening to
introduce their silence as circumstantial evidence of guilt at trial.108 In
enforcement authorities, political influence over and potential corruption of legal authorities, the
effectiveness of laws governing whistleblowing, willingness to use accomplice testimony, and laws
mandating self-reporting of misconduct.
106. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 15 (1998).
107. See generally LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., MIRANDA WARNING EQUIVALENTS ABROAD 15
(2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/miranda-warning-equivalents-abroad/miranda-warning-equivalent
s-abroad.pdf [https://perma.cc/C292-3CST] (concluding that Cambodia does not recognize a right to
silence). For example, in China, people do not have a right to refuse to answer questions asked by
regulators, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission or the Public Securities Bureau, on the
grounds that the answers would involve self-incrimination. Michael Han & Jonathan Wong,
Investigations in China, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE 483, 491
(Paul Lomas & Daniel J. Kramer eds., 2d ed. 2013). In Hong Kong, individuals may not refuse to answer
questions on grounds of self-incrimination. In addition, no privilege against self-incrimination bars the
compelled production of documents, although such evidence may be used only derivatively against the
person, not directly. Georgia Dawson et al., Investigations in Hong Kong, in CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra, at 419, 425–26.
108. France permits a strong inference that people who refuse to explain their circumstances are
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England and Wales, suspects are cautioned that invocation of the right to
silence can harm their defense, because the fact-finder may draw an
inference against facts that the suspect seeks to rely on at trial that were not
disclosed during the government’s interview.109
Moreover, prosecutors in several countries can compel an implicated
witness to speak, notwithstanding a right to silence, without granting
derivative use immunity.110 In England and Wales, both the SFO and the
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) have statutory authority to compel
people to answer questions.111 Although compelled statements may not be
used directly against the speaker in a criminal prosecution, prosecutors may
be able to make derivative use of such statements, thus avoiding the
guilty. See Antoine Kirry et al., France, in THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW 114, 118
(Nicolas Bourtin ed., 8th ed. 2018). The risk of negative inference is enhanced in countries with strong
cultural norms against invoking the right to silence.
109. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Silence, Self-Incrimination, and Hazards of Globalization, in
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 308, 320–21 (Jacqueline E. Ross & Stephen C. Thaman eds.,
2016); Jessica Parker & Andrew Smith, Representing Individuals in Interviews: The UK Perspective, in
THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 234, 241 (Judith Seddon et al. eds., 2d ed.
2017); Peter B. Pope et al., The Clash of Legal Cultures in the Brave New World of International Law
Enforcement, N.Y.U.: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 27, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_e
nforcement/2018/03/27/the-clash-of-legal-cultures-in-the-brave-new-world-of-international-law-enforce
ment [https://perma.cc/TR4A-45ND].
110. According to a recent petition filed by the DOJ for rehearing in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, the following foreign authorities can obtain evidence, including testimony, on pain of sanction:
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, El Salvador,
Estonia, the European Union, France, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. See Petition of the United States
for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 13–14, United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No.
16-898). Similarly, in Ireland, regulatory authorities can compel cooperation, subject to a form of use
immunity. Carina Lawlor, Ireland, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 614, 619
(Judith Seddon et al. eds., 2016). In Brazil, enforcement authorities’ ability to pressure implicated people
to answer questions is undermined by subjects’ ability to lie with impunity. Camila V. Ancken et al.,
Brazil, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW OF 13 JURISDICTIONS 51, 69–71 (Stephen
Spehl & Thomas Gruetzner eds., 2013). Prosecutors in other countries may be less impeded by rights that
do exist if they face a narrower exclusionary rule. See infra note 170.
111. The Director of the SFO has authority to investigate suspected offenses involving serious or
complex fraud. The SFO Director can compel witnesses to answer relevant questions and provide any
relevant documents. See Criminal Justice Act 1987, c. 38 § 2 (U.K.). The Financial Conduct Authority
regulates financial services firms and markets in the United Kingdom through monitoring, investigations,
sanctions, and civil and criminal proceedings. See Enforcement, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY,
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement [https://perma.cc/N3QA-HG2X]. The FCA also has the
power to compel, and impose sanctions for refusal. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, §§
171, 174, 177 (U.K.). The FCA also has the power to compel witnesses to speak, but usually does not do
so with targets. It favors “interviews under caution” with suspects in a criminal proceeding. U.K. FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK § 2.14(4) (2020), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook
[https://perma.cc/J4HJ-9924]. Other U.K. enforcement authorities, such as the Competition and Markets
Authority, the National Crime Agency, and the Health and Safety Executive have similar powers to
compel witnesses to answer questions and produce documents. Hector Gonzalez et al., Production of
Information to the Authorities, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note
109, at 173, 175.
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burdensome or disabling task of disproving taint that U.S. prosecutors face
when deploying immunity powers.112 While English prosecutors tend not to
compel statements from people they expect to charge,113 they do compel
statements by implicated employees for use against others—an important
tool if prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to induce a witness to cooperate
voluntarily. U.K. prosecutors can also compel cooperation by an employee
they assume is not a suspect, without losing the ability to use evidence
derived from that testimony against the employee if they later learn that the
employee should be charged.114 Finally, the SFO can compel testimony for
use against a subject in a civil matter, such as an action to confiscate illegal
gains.115
Similarly, some enforcement authorities in Australia, including the
Securities and Investment Commission and the Crime Commission, can
compel implicated witnesses to cooperate.116 Indeed, Australian authorities
112. In England and Wales, prosecutors are constrained by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60 (Eng. & Wales). Section 76 of the Act permits a judge
to exclude confessions for unreliability, such as confessions obtained through oppression, and Section 78
allows exclusion of material that would affect the fairness of the trial. Id. §§ 76, 78. Furthermore, Section
78 gives judges’ discretion to exclude evidence that would affect the fairness of the trial in light of all the
circumstances, provides judges with discretion to exclude a confession obtained in violation of a
defendant’s right to silence, but does not require it, and can, but often does not, extend to evidentiary
fruits of the excluded statement. Mazzone, supra note 109, at 321–22; see also Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 76(4)(a) (Eng.) (“The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in
pursuance of this section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence of any facts discovered as a result
of the confession . . . .”). Cautious prosecutors prefer not to compel statements by targets to avoid
exclusion.
113. The SFO has avoided using its powers under Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act against
someone it expects to charge in recognition of both the uncertain admissibility of evidence derived from
such testimony, see supra note 111, and a 1996 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that found
compelling testimony by an accused violates Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
See Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313 (1996). Compulsory production of documents is
permitted, however. Id.
114. English enforcement officials, upon learning that an employee is implicated, tend to caution
the employee and stop the interview until a lawyer is present, in order to provide the expected procedural
protections needed to ensure that any evidence obtained could be used against the witness at trial, should
charges be brought. Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, Code C, Paragraph 10.1 (Eng. & Wales)
(when questioning someone whom there are grounds to suspect of an offense, the person must be
cautioned if either the suspect’s answers or silence, may be given in evidence to a court in a prosecution,
unless a narrow exception applies). If enforcement officials do compel testimony, these procedural
protections also are respected, although lawyers play a more passive role in interrogations in the England
than in the United States. See infra note 121 (discussing the role of defense counsel in interrogations).
115. The SFO also pursues civil actions to confiscate benefits of crime. The SFO can obtain and
directly use compelled statements to confiscate benefits civilly, including statements identifying the
location of assets. Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002, c. 29, § 357 (U.K.) (authorizing investigators seeking
a civil recovery to obtain a disclosure order from a judge compelling a person to answer questions or
produce documents or face criminal sanctions).
116. Statutory commissions in Australia have the power to require a person to attend an examination
to answer under oath. It is an offense to fail to answer at an examination, even if the answer could be
incriminating. Honorable T.F. Bathurst, AC, Chief Justice of N.S.W., Address at Univ. of N.S.W.:
Statutory Commissions, Compulsory Examinations and Common Law Rights (Mar. 21, 2016),
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have compelled statements from defendants subject to pending charges.117
Although prosecutors may not make direct use of compelled statements,118
they can make derivative use of such statements to either obtain other
evidence or prepare for trial.119
Government investigators in many countries also benefit from the
freedom to interview implicated suspects away from the protective
interventions of defense counsel. Suspects do not have a right to have
counsel present during all interrogations in countries including Germany,
England and Wales, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Canada.120 Other
countries allow counsel to attend but limit their ability to intervene during
interrogation.121 In France, witnesses who are not suspects do not have a
right to have counsel present during questioning by police or investigating
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/2016%20Speeches/Bat
hurst%20CJ/Bathurst_20160321.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT78-7F9F]); see also R v OC (2015) 90 NSWLR
134, 161–63 (Austl.); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 19, 63.
117. Compare Lee v NSWCC (2013) 251 CLR 196 (Austl.), with X7 v Australian Crime Comm’n
(2013) 248 CLR 92 (Austl.).
118. For a discussion of the prohibition on direct use, see, for example, Bathurst, supra note 116, at
3, and see also Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 68(3) (stating that a
transcript cannot be used in any criminal or penalty proceedings against an individual).
119. For example, enforcement officials can review statements made by an accused under
compulsion, following invocation of the privilege, in order to prepare for trial. R v OC (2015) 90 NSWLR
134, 120–22 (Austl.); see also Transcript of Proceedings, OC v The Queen [2016] HCATrans 026 (12
February 2016) (Austl.). Moreover, the Competition and Consumer Act only prevents use in criminal
proceedings (essentially cartel proceedings); the transcript can be used in civil penalty proceedings. See
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 159 (Austl.).
120. See, e.g., Jacqueline S. Hodgson, From the Domestic to the European: An Empirical Approach
to Comparative Custodial Legal Advice, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 109, at
258, 270–71 (stating that in the Netherlands, counsel is not permitted in the interrogation room). In
Germany, suspects do not have a right to have counsel present at an initial interrogation done by the
police. Diskant, supra note 18, at 156. However, suspects do have a statutory right to have counsel present
if the interrogation is done by a prosecutor or judge, and witnesses always have a right to have counsel
present during interrogations. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNGITPO] [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE],
§§ 68b, 136, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html [https://
perma.cc/9UBT-JBRU] (Ger.). In England and Wales, counsel do not have an absolute right to attend a
compelled interrogation. Parker & Smith, supra note 109, at 239. In Singapore, police can question an
arrested suspect without counsel present, as long as the suspect is afforded counsel within a “reasonable
time” after arrest. See Hock Lai Ho, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Right of Access to a
Lawyer: A Comparative Assessment, 25 SING. ACAD. L.J. 826, 833, 838–39 (2013). Canada allows
government authorities to continue questioning subjects after invocation of the right, although continued
questioning in the face of repeated invocations of the right to silence could lead a court to conclude that
statements made were involuntary, and are therefore excludable. See Lisa Dufraimont, The Interrogation
Trilogy and the Protections for Interrogated Suspects in Canadian Law, 54 SUP. CT. L. REV. 309, 314
(2011). Investigators in France, Russia, Brazil, Peru, China, Hong Kong, Serbia, and Scotland are not
required to caution suspects about the right to counsel. See generally LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., supra note
107.
121. In France, lawyers can attend police interrogations but must remain passive. Hodgson, supra
note 120, at 271. In England and Wales, a lawyer permitted to attend an interview can provide legal advice
and essential assistance but must not interrupt the flow of information provided by the subject. Parker &
Smith, supra note 109, at 239. Counsel in England may stop the interview, however. See Hodgson, supra
note 120, at 271.
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judges.122 Finally, in many countries, including England and Germany,
prosecutors who violate a subject’s right to silence or counsel nevertheless
likely can introduce at trial evidence derived from those illegally obtained
statements, and, in some countries, the statements themselves.123
Therefore, prosecutors in other jurisdictions active in the investigation
of corporate crime do not face the same steep costs, and difficult choices,
that, as explored in Part II above, would confront U.S. prosecutors if they
were to attempt to detect and investigate corporate crime without the
assistance of firms.
B. CORPORATIONS’ INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
Overseas companies may be less able, and less willing, to conduct
robust internal investigations due to differences in interrogation law,
employment law, legal privileges, and data privacy regimes. These doctrines
in other nations can both impede corporations’ ability to obtain information
from employees and increase the costs of investigations, with the greatest
likely effect falling on investigation of misconduct that government officials
have not yet detected. Thus, foreign enforcement officials may gain less than
U.S. prosecutors from providing incentives for corporations to detect and
self-report misconduct, and to cooperate by sharing the results of internal
investigations.
122. DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, 10 THINGS U.S. CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT DEFENDING A CASE IN FRANCE 34 (2019), https://www.debevoise.com/-/media/files/pdf/201905
21_10_things_us_criminal_defense_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/B34H-UMKN]. Suspects in France only
obtained the right to have counsel present during police interrogations in the last ten years, and even then
lawyer-client consultations are limited to 30 minutes. Jacqueline Hodgson & Laurène Soubise,
Prosecution in France, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE, at § 2.2 (2016) https://www.oxfordhandbooks.c
om/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-124 [https://perma.c
c/F736-ZWZC].
123. In England and Wales, confessions obtained in violation of a suspect’s right to silence are not
automatically excluded. Instead, courts determine admissibility by balancing the severity of the breach
with the severity of the offense, and regularly give considerable weight to the public’s interests in
prosecuting crimes and seeking the truth. See Mazzone, supra note 109, at 322–23, 333–34. In Germany,
as in most inquisitorial systems, evidence is presumptively admissible. Diskant, supra note 18, at 157.
Courts employ a balancing test to determine exclusion of confessions obtained in violation of a suspect’s
rights and permit admission of evidence derived from such statements in some circumstances. See
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 136a, para. 3, sentence 2,
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html [https://perma.cc/9U
BT-JBRU] (Ger.); see also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH ] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 18, 1980, 2 StR
731/79, para. 9; Federal Court of Justice, judgement of 24 August, 1983 - 3 StR 136/83, BGHSt 32, 68;
Federal Court of Justice, Sept. 14, 2010 StR 573/09, para. 13; BECK’SCHER ONLINE-KOMMENTAR:
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [IOK STPO MIT RISTBV UND MISTRA] [BECK’S ONLINE COMMENTARY: CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 136a, para. 33 (Jürgen-Peter Graf ed., 31st ed. 2018); see generally
Mazzone, supra note 109, at 333–34.
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1. Corporations’ Ability to Obtain Statements from Employees
a. Restrictions on Interviews During Government Investigations
In several countries, companies’ ability to cooperate is undermined by
laws or practices that preclude them from interviewing potential witnesses
once a civil or criminal investigation has commenced.124 For example, in
France, corporations subject to a preliminary investigation are expected not
to contact investigating authorities or witnesses prior to a determination of
whether there is sufficient evidence that the company is a suspect,125 because
doing so could be deemed an improper attempt to exert.126 In Switzerland,
lawyers investigating for companies cannot take actions that could influence
possible witnesses, a prohibition understood to preclude firms from
conducting formal interviews after a government investigation has
commenced (although firms may engage in softer fact-finding discussions
with employees).127
In England and Wales, enforcement officials regularly request that
companies refrain from interviewing implicated or material witnesses once
their own investigations have commenced to avoid negative impact on
124. Christopher J. Clark, The Complexities to International White Collar Enforcement, in
INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING CROSSBORDER REGULATIONS, DEVELOPING CLIENT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, AND RESPONDING TO
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 7, 57 (Michaela Falls ed., 2010) [hereinafter INT’L WHITE COLLAR
ENFORCEMENT]; D. Michael Crites, Recent Trends in White Collar Crime, in INT’L WHITE COLLAR
ENFORCEMENT (rev. ed. 2011); Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the
Globalization of Internal Investigations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 380 (2011).
125. DEBEVOISE AND PLIMPTON, supra note 122, at 39; see Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 122, at
Section 2.2 (discussing the generally “limited and passive” role of defense counsel during the preliminary
investigation). In France, criminal investigations often are conducted by a magistrate who determines
whether there is sufficient evidence that an individual or corporation has committed a crime (mise en
examen). Kirry et al., supra note 108, at 115. Once an investigation has been placed under the supervision
of an investigating magistrate, the target (the person given mise en examen status) has the right to appear
before the magistrate to present evidence, although the magistrate retains full discretion as to what weight
to give this evidence. The matter can then be referred for trial. Thus, in France much of the investigation
takes place before the target has a right to introduce evidence. This can reduce the value to government
investigators of evidence provided by the firm as they must first obtain sufficient evidence to determine
that a firm is a suspect on their own. DEBEVOISE AND PLIMPTON, supra note 122, at 35–39.
126. See Stephane de Navacelle, et al., France, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 109, at 697, 706; DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, supra note 122, at 39; Kirry
et al, supra note 108, at 116–17; see also Dervan, supra note 124, at 380. In the U.S., some prosecutors
may ask a company not to interview certain important witnesses until after the prosecutors have spoken
with them first but will allow firms to do so after those interviews have occurred. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra
note 6, § 9-47.120 (FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy) (providing that prosecutors may request a
cooperating company “to defer investigative steps, such as the interview of company employees or third
parties… for a limited period of time… Once the justification dissipates, the Department will notify the
company that the Department is lifting its request”).
127. Benjamin Borsodi & Louis Burrus, Switzerland, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 665, 672.
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government interviews.128 In addition, authorities prefer to be the first to
interview important witnesses in order to ensure that requisite procedures are
followed for obtaining evidence that may be used at trial. For example, if a
firm’s investigators threatened an implicated employee with disciplinary
action if she refused to admit wrongdoing, or offered protection from
dismissal for confessing, a judge might exclude resulting statements on the
grounds that they were unfairly obtained or unreliable. Reliability also may
be questioned if the corporation did not record the interview and the
employer and employee later disagree about what was said.129 Evidence
obtained by a firm investigating misconduct as part of a criminal matter also
may not be admissible if investigators did not caution the employee about
the right to counsel.130
b. Limitations on Pressuring Employees to Speak
In many other countries, employers cannot use the threat of termination
to pressure employees to cooperate because employment laws either
preclude such threats or impose procedural impediments to employee
discipline.131 In addition, non-implicated employees often do not voluntarily
provide evidence about others, either because they fear retaliation or because
they reside in a country with a strong cultural norm against informing on
colleagues, such as in France.132
In the U.S., employer-employee relationships, including employees’
rights, are largely defined by contract. By contrast, many countries view
employment as a status automatically conferring substantive and procedural
128. See Caroline Day & Louise Hodges, Witness Interviews in Internal Investigations: The UK
Perspective, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 91, 100,
103.
129. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, §§ 76, 78 (Eng. & Wales). A court is
required by section 76 to exclude a confession that it concludes is unreliable. The court has discretion
under section 78 to exclude a confession that is unfairly obtained.
130. While internal investigators can interview employees without counsel if investigating for
purposes of an internal disciplinary proceeding, corporate investigators interviewing employees with a
view to providing evidence for a criminal investigation may be required to caution implicated employees
about their right to counsel. See Day & Hodges, supra note 128, at 103. Compare R v. Twaites (1991) 92
Cr. App. R. 106 (Eng.), with R v. Welcher [2007] EWCA (Crim) 480 (Eng.).
131. For a discussion of sanctions and efficacy of enforcement in many countries, see generally
Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 69.
132.
Jérémy Bernard et al., Investigations in France, in CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 107, at 277, 309. Employees in other
countries also may fear negative repercussions by superiors (outside the formal disciplinary process) for
providing information about detected misconduct. This can deter them from coming forward either
internally or externally. As of 2013, only four European Union countries had strong protections for
whistleblowers; others had only partial or no protections. Cf. Whistleblower Protection: Commission Sets
New, EU-Wide Rules, EUR. COMMISSION (Apr. 23, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-183441_en.htm [https://perma.cc/235A-HLXY]. See generally WHISTLEBLOWING IN EUROPE, supra note
18.
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rights that dictate both the employee’s treatment during the relationship and
situations under which the relationship can be terminated.
Indeed, in some countries, including Australia, Austria, Brazil, Italy,
and Switzerland, employees effectively have a right against selfincrimination in workplace investigations because employment law bars
employers from pressuring implicated employees to cooperate.133 In other
countries, such as Germany, the right to silence does not strictly apply in
private interviews,134 but statements obtained by an employer from an
implicated employee may be inadmissible against the employee in a criminal
action.135
133. Countries that in effect grant a right to silence to employees with a genuine and reasonable
apprehension of being implicated include Australia, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. See, e.g., Grant v
BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2017] 247 FCR 295 (Austl.) (discussing Australia and citing Police Service Board v
Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397, 403, 408, 411); Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p.] art. 391 bis no. 9 (Italy);
Bettina Knoetzl, Austria, in GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW: THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS 647, 654 (Judith Seddon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2018) (right against self-incrimination applies
if the internal investigation can be expected to provide information to a criminal investigation); Mark
Livschitz, Switzerland, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW OF 13 JURISDICTIONS,
supra note 110, at 347, 380 (employee’s duty to cooperate does not apply if the employee would risk
incrimination). In Brazil, interpretations of the constitution and case law suggest that employers may not
sanction implicated employees who invoke their right to silence. Ancken et al., supra note 110, at 69–71;
Juliana Sá de Miranda, Brazil: Handling Internal Investigations, in THE INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW OF THE
AMERICAS 2018 51, 53 (2018) (discussing Brazil). Indeed, Brazilian courts have concluded that an
employee may exercise his right to silence by lying, even under oath. Brazil does not have a crime of
perjury applicable to criminal defendants. Ancken et al., supra note 110, at 59, 69–71, 76. In Germany,
the duty of loyalty set forth in section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB) obliges employees generally
to answer the questions in a truthful and complete manner if they relate to the employment relationship.
Cf. HANS-GEORG KAMANN ET. AL, KARTELLVERFAHREN UND KARTELLPROZESS [CARTEL PROCEEDINGS
AND TRIAL] § 40 (2017); THOMAS ROTSCH, CRIMINAL COMPLIANCE § 7 (2015); Peter Schrader et al.,
Auskunft durch den Arbeitnehmer: Was darf er? Was muss er? [Information from the Employee: What
Can He Do? What Does He Have to Do?], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [NZA] 965, 968
(2018).
134. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH ] [Federal Court of Justice], Nov. 30, 1989, III ZR 112/88
(Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH ] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 30, 1964, VII ZR 156/62 (Ger.);
Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Sept. 7, 1995, 8 AZR 828/93 (Ger.);
LandesarbeitsgerichtArbeitsgericht [LAG] Hamm [The Higher Labor Court of Hamm] Mar. 3, 2010, 14
Sa 1689/08 (Ger.) (an employee’s constitutional right to silence does not apply to private parties); cf.
Björn Krug & Christoph Skoupil, Befragungen im Rahmen von internen Untersuchungen [Surveys in the
Context of Internal Investigations], NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2374, 2375 (2017).
135. The highest German court has not yet ruled on whether an employee`s statements provided to
her employer under the obligation to provide information can be used in the later criminal proceedings.
Lower courts are split on the issue. CHRISTOPH E. HAUSCHKA, KLAUS MOOSMAYER & THOMAS LÖSLER,
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE § 46 (3d ed., 2016). Some German courts have ruled that incriminating
compelled statements by an employee to an employer may not be introduced as evidence against that
employee in criminal proceedings in some circumstances. See BVerfG, Jan. 13, 1981, 1 BvR 116/77, Jan.
13, 1981; AB Mar. 3, 2010, 14 Sa 1689/08; Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law,
1 COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE J. 74, 92 (2015). But see LG Oct. 15, 2010, 608 Qs 18/10 (Ger.) (concluding
that the self-incriminating statements should not be excluded).
In England and Wales, employers seeking to obtain credit for providing interview evidence
must take care not to make threats or promises that might lead a court to conclude that the interview was
unreliable or obtained through unfair process. Compare R v. Twaites (1991) 92 Cr. App. R 106 (Eng.),
with R v. Welcher [2007] EWCA Crim. 480 (Eng.). See also Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c.
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In addition, employers often cannot use the threat of termination to
compel cooperation by either implicated or non-implicated employees
because in many countries employees can be terminated only for cause;
failure to cooperate often does not provide adequate cause for immediate
termination.136 To justify termination under such a regime, the employee
must have a duty to answer the questions asked and termination must be a
proportionate response to the employee’s breach. Employers who rush to
terminate without adequate grounds risk suit for wrongful dismissal.137
Employees do not always have a duty to answer their employer’s questions
even about workplace conduct. For example, Brazilian employees have a
right to either refuse to attend the interview, or attend and then refuse to
answer or lie with impunity.138 In Belgium, employees also have the right
not to cooperate; employers who threaten discipline violate their duty to
ensure that the employee’s statements are voluntary.139
In other countries, employees are required to cooperate, at least if the
employer had a formal policy requiring them do to so, but only in limited
circumstances.140 For example, in France and Germany, employees have a
duty to answer only questions directly related to matters within the scope of
their jobs. They may refuse to answer other questions, including questions
about observations of others’ behavior falling outside that employee’s scope
60, §§ 76, 78 (Eng.); Day & Hodges, supra note 128, at 103, 112–13, 123.
136. See, e.g., DONALD C. DOWLING, JR., HOW TO CONDUCT AN INTERNATIONAL INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION 6 (2019), https://www.littler.com/files/international_investigations.pdf [https://perma.c
c/G6PA-R4ZN].
137. For example, in England, employees have prevailed against employers on the grounds that the
employer’s failure to consider alternatives to suspension was a breach of the employer’s duty of trust and
confidence, thus triggering a claim for constructive dismissal—a claim not easily won but that, if
successful, provides the employee with both damages and release from post-termination restrictions on
conduct. James Carlton et al., Employee Rights: The UK Perspective, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 175, 179. In addition, in some countries in Latin America,
a company that either threatens an employee for refusing to cooperate or accuses an employee of
misconduct during an interview risks a lawsuit for moral damages for infringing on the employee’s
dignitary rights. Ancken et al., supra note 110, at 61. Employers must tread carefully with employees’
dignitary interests in other countries as well, such as France. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for
judicial matters] soc., Feb. 25, 2003, Bull. civ. V., No. 66 (Fr.) (sanctioning an employer for infringing
on an employee’s dignity by disclosing his actions to co-workers with no specific reason).
138. Sá de Miranda, supra note 133, at 53.
139. Hans Van Bavel & Frank Staelens, Belgium, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO: CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 2018 25, 29 (2d ed. 2018).
140. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L.1232-1 (Fr.). In Germany, employees may
have a right to resist if the employment agreement does not specify a right to cooperate or if the
employee’s personality rights preempt the employer’s right to information. See Bundesarbeitsgericht
[BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Sept. 7, 1995, 8 AZR 828/93 (Ger.). See also Michael Kempter & Björn
Steinat, Compliance – arbeitsrechtliche Gestaltungsinstrumente und Auswirkungen in der Praxis
[Compliance—Employment-Related Design Instruments and Effects in Practice], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
ARBEITSRECHT [NZA] 1505, 1511 (2017).
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of activity.141
Even when employees are obligated to cooperate, labor laws often
preclude employers from immediately threatening to fire employees who
refuse to cooperate. In countries that require for-cause termination,
disciplinary sanctions must be proportionate to the severity of the
employee’s breach. In many countries, including France, Belgium, Brazil,
England and Wales, Switzerland, and Japan, an employee’s failure to
cooperate is not likely to be considered adequate cause for termination.142
141. For example, in France and Germany, employees’ duty to answer questions only applies to
conduct in the core areas assigned to the employee. Thus, employees most likely need not answer
questions about breaches by other employees. French courts do not always take an employer-friendly
interpretation of whether questions relate to the employee’s ability to perform, particularly when the
questions involve the employees’ observations of the conduct of others. Courts regularly conclude that
the employee’s right of personality prevails over the employer’s right of information. CODE DU TRAVAIL
[C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L.1222-2 (Fr.) (providing that information requested by an employer from
an employee must be only for the purpose of appreciating his/her professional abilities; the information
requested must be directly and necessarily in connection with the employee's abilities);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH ] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 23, 1989, IX ZR 236/86, para. 95 (Ger.); ArbG
Arbeitsgericht [AB] Mecklenburg-Vorpommern [Labor Court of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania] July 8,
2016, 2 Sa 190/15, para. 95 (Ger.); Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Sept. 7, 1995, 8
AZR 828/93 (Ger.). See also David Charlot et al., France, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS:
OVERVIEW OF 13 JURISDICTIONS, supra note 110, at 141, 153 (discussing France); Peter Kasiske,
Mitarbeiterbefragungen im Rahmen interner Ermittlungen–Auskunftspflichten und Verwertbarkeit im
Strafverfahren [Employee Surveys Within the Scope of Internal Investigations—Information Obligations
and Usability in Criminal Proceedings], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT-, STEUER- UND
UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT [NZWIST] 262, 264 (2014) (discussing Germany). In Germany, employees
do have a limited obligation to answer questions about matters outside the workplace, such as incidents
on a business trip. Volker Stück, Unternehmensinterne Untersuchungen im Spannungsfeld von
Arbeitsrecht, Compliance, Datenschutz, Haftungsrecht und Strafrecht [Internal Investigations in the Area
of Tension Between Labor Law, Compliance, Data Protection, Liability Law and Criminal Law], in
GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GmbHR] 156, 161 (2019). This may include an obligation to provide
information about criminal offenses committed by a colleague that could be detrimental to the employer.
MARCUS BÖTTGER, WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHT IN DER PRAXIS [COMMERCIAL CRIMINAL LAW IN
PRACTICE] 2. AUFLAGE ch. 18 (2015); HAUSCHKA, MOOSMAYER & LÖSLER, supra note 135, § 46;
Schrader et al., supra note 133, at 965, 971.
142. In France, there are no legal provisions permitting employers to sanction employees for
refusing to cooperate. An employer can only suspend an employee if the employee has either committed
misconduct or is under investigation for such. Bernard et al., supra note 132, at 313 (citing Art. 143-3 of
the General Regulation of the AMF). Indeed, an employer who threatens an employee for failing to
cooperate may be deemed to have committed an unlawful act that renders any information the employer
obtains inadmissible in a judicial proceeding. Charlot et al., supra note 141, at 153, 156–57. Exclusion is
particularly likely in a disciplinary action by the employer against the employee. Bernard et al., supra
note 132, at 308 (evidence may be inadmissible in a disciplinary action against the employee). In England
and Wales, an employer must establish that it has reasonable grounds for the suspension or termination,
such as evidence that the employee engaged in serious misconduct. Carlton et. al., supra note 137, at 175.
In the United Kingdom, suspension is less of a threat than in the United States because unpaid suspension
is rare, and indeed is not an option unless the employer explicitly contracted for the right to do so. Id. at
177.
In Switzerland, terminating an innocent employee whose only breach was a violation of the
duty to cooperate with the investigation will likely be deemed excessive and thus invalid. Livschitz, supra
note 133, at 372, 386. In Japan, courts are unlikely to conclude that a refusal to cooperate is “reasonable
grounds” for dismissal, since that standard is interpreted in light of Japan’s historical culture favoring
lifetime employment. See Labor Contract Act, Law No. 128 of 2007, art. 3, para 4 (Japan). In Brazil,
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Even when termination for non-cooperation is possible, employers often
cannot threaten termination until less extreme forms of discipline, such as a
formal warning letter or suspension, have failed,143 and, even then, only in
some circumstances. In countries such as Germany and Austria, even
repeated refusals to cooperate may not justify dismissal. To justify
termination, the employee’s repeated refusal must provide the employer
reasonable grounds for concluding that the employee cannot be trusted in the
future. The employer may be unable to establish this if the employee is
otherwise trustworthy and is not implicated in the offense, or if the employer
did not terminate other non-cooperative employees.144 Indeed, an employer
may be unable to fire an employee who engaged in misconduct if the
misconduct was not severe, the employee was low-level and acting under
termination for cause is viewed as the harshest disciplinary measure only for extreme situations, such as
if there is evidence that the employee engaged in corruption, theft of corporate information, or fraud.
Companies have the burden of proof in cases of termination for cause. Sá de Miranda, supra note 133, at
53.
143. For example, in Australia an employer must warn an employee prior to commencing
procedures to fire him. See Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 69, at 359–60. Even then, termination will
not be permitted if it is deemed harsh, unjust, or unreasonable under the circumstances. See Mocanu v
Kone Elevators Pty Ltd., [2018] FWC 1335 (Austl.). In England, Wales, Germany, and Italy, companies
are expected to proceed through stages, beginning with a warning, and moving to more serious sanctions
short of dismissal, before seeking dismissal. Employers may need to delay sanction until obtaining the
employee’s justification. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 622, 626 (Ger.)
(employers should warn first, unless a compelling reason justifies termination without notice);
Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court], June 10, 2010, 2 AZR 541/09; ERFURTER
KOMMENTAR ZUM ARBEITSRECHT [COMMENT ON LABOR LAW] ¶ 198 (19th ed. 2019) (Ger.); Carlton et
al., supra note 137, at 179; Gianfranco Di Garbo et al., Italy, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS:
OVERVIEW OF 13 JURISDICTIONS, supra note 110, at 245, 270–71; Sebastian Lach et al., Germany, in THE
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 569; Joanna Ludlam & Henry
Garfield, England and Wales, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW OF 13
JURISDICTIONS, supra note 110, at 105, 126–27; Carlton et al., supra note 137, at 179; Burkard Göpfert
et al., “Mitarbeiter als Wissensträger”—Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Compliance-Diskussion [Employees
as Knowledge Carriers—A Contribution to the Current Compliance Discussion], NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1703, 1707 (2008) (Ger.); Volker Rieble, Schuldrechtliche Zeugenpflicht von
Mitarbeitern [Obligatory Witnessing of Employees], ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1273
(2003) (Ger.).
144. In Germany and Austria, employers cannot reliably fire an employee for refusing to cooperate
even when the employee had a duty to do so. Employers must establish that termination is needed to
protect the employer, and not as a punishment. Failure to cooperate may not constitute adequate cause
for dismissal if the employee is not implicated and has otherwise proved trustworthy. See
Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Oct. 23, 2008, 2 AZR 483/07, para. 32 (Ger.); see
also Philipp Becker et al., Investigations in Germany, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: AN
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 107, at 225, 263 (discussing Germany). Repeated failure to cooperate
may provide cause for termination in Germany if the employer sends the employee a formal warning
letter and the employee commits a subsequent violation. Lach et al., supra note 143, at 717. These
substantive and procedural limitations on dismissal apply even if the employer has concluded that the
employee committed misconduct. Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Oct. 23, 2008, 2
AZR 483/07, para. 32 (Ger.). Repeated failure can justify termination in Austria if it provides evidence
of untrustworthiness, yet threat of termination is a last resort, and the employer’s right to take such action
must be found in a law, a collective agreement, or a works agreement. Georg Krakow & Alexander
Petsche, Austria, in CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW OF 13 JURISDICTIONS, supra
note 110, at 1, 24–25, 33–34.
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orders, or the misconduct was severe but was committed with the company’s
knowledge or tacit consent.145
Labor laws can also impose procedural burdens likely to dissuade
companies from disciplining non-cooperative employees, particularly when
investigating misconduct of which the government is unaware. For example,
in many countries, employees targeted for discipline are entitled to be
apprised of the evidence against them, including witness statements or
portions of an investigatory report relevant to their conduct146—information
that companies may be particularly reluctant to share when the government
is unaware of the misconduct. Moreover, companies cannot necessarily
145. See Kazuo Sugeno & Keiichi Yamakoshi, Dismissals in Japan: Part One: How Strict Is
Japanese Law on Employers?, 11 JAPAN LAB. REV. 83 (2014), reprinted in THE JAPAN INST. FOR LAB.
POLICY & TRAINING, DISMISSALS IN JAPAN 1 (2015), https://www.jil.go.jp/english/archives/docume
nts/201501_dismissals_in_japan.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEJ3-AQVM] (discussing Japan); Kazuo Sugeno
& Keiichi Yamakoshi, Dismissals in Japan: Part Two: How Frequently Do Employers Dismiss
Employees?, 11 JAPAN LAB. REV. 118 (2014), reprinted in THE JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POLICY &
TRAINING, DISMISSALS IN JAPAN 11, http://www.jil.go.jp/english/archives/documents /201501_
dismissals_ in_japan.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEJ3-AQVM] (discussing Japan). In Germany, a dismissal of
an employee for suspected misconduct will withstand judicial review only if the employee’s misconduct
appears based on substantiated incriminating facts, exonerating circumstances have been reasonably
assessed, and the employer has exhausted all available sources to clarify the matter. Mario Eylert, Die
Verdachtskündigung [The Suspicion Termination], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT
RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT ARBEITSRECHT [NZA-RR] 393, 404 (2014) (Ger.). In France, a labor court
required Société Générale to pay $510,000 for terminating an employee convicted of fraud relating to
rogue trading. The court concluded that the bank fired the employee to punish him for the sanction
imposed on the bank, instead of for the misconduct itself, because the bank learned of his rogue trading
in 2007 but did nothing until 2008. Michael Stothard, Kerviel Wins €400,000 from SocGen for Unfair
Dismissal, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/82e3c230-2ca6-11e6-bf8d26294ad519fc [https://perma.cc/A5WX-6LPD]. The employee also was ordered to pay Société Générale
damages for the losses he caused. Janina Conboye & David Keohane, French Court Rejects Jérôme
Kerviel Request for Retrial, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/b63b7606-bce011e8-8274-55b72926558f [https://perma.cc/Q8ZV-K8DL].
146. For example, in England, an employer seeking to terminate an employee for cause must
undertake a three-step process of notice and meetings prior to disciplinary action. The employee must be
given a hearing, including the right to respond to allegations, and an opportunity to appeal. Employment
Code of Practice (Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures) 2004, SI 2004/2356 (Eng.). Furthermore,
employees suspected of misconduct are often placed on garden leave (leave with pay) pending the
resolution of any criminal proceedings against them. In Ireland, employees have a constitutional right to
fair procedures in any investigatory or disciplinary process, which obligates the employer to keep the
employee apprised of the investigation and give the employee a right to participate in the investigation.
Lawlor, supra note 110, at 620–21. Switzerland and Australia afford employees subject to discipline
various rights, generally including notice, the right to confront witnesses, discovery rights (such as the
right to access to internal investigation files), and protection against any threats by the employer.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 4, 2016, 4A_694/2015 (Switz.). See Fair Work Act
2009 (Cth) ch. 3 pt. 3-2 div 3 sub-div 387(c) (Austl.); Farmer v KDR Victoria Pty Ltd T/A Yarra Trams
[2014] FWC 6539 (Austl.); Cannan v Nyrstar Hobart Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 5072 (Austl.). See generally
Andrew Tobin & Adele Garnett, Misconduct Investigations: Our Top Tips, HOPGOOD GANIM (Mar. 20,
2015), https://www.hopgoodganim.com.au/page/knowledge-centre/blog/misconduct-investigations-ourtop-tips [https://perma.cc/289C-7UGQ] (discussing Australia). In France, an employer seeking to dismiss
an employee must provide notice, meet with the employee to explain its rationale, and provide the
employee with opportunity and time to respond. See Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 69, at 389.
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avoid premature revelation of investigations by waiting to discipline
employees until after the government learns of misconduct. Labor laws in
many countries, such as France, require companies to initiate all intended
disciplinary proceedings relatively quickly after discovering facts justifying
discipline.147 In addition, in countries that predicate termination on the
employer’s inability to trust the employee, such as Germany, France, and
Australia, a company that delays disciplining a non-cooperative employee
may undermine a claim of just cause for firing.148 Thus, companies
conducting internal investigations overseas may not be able to both threaten
to fire employees in order to induce them to talk and maintain confidentiality
of investigative findings.
c. Employees’ Access to Counsel During Employer Interviews
In the United States, companies often benefit from the ability to
interview employees about sensitive matters without the employee having
counsel present. By contrast, in many other countries, companies cannot
interview employees in isolation because labor laws, contracts, union
agreements, or bar rules give employees a right to consult a representative,
such as a lawyer or union official, prior to an interview, and may give them
a right to representation during the interview.149
147. Indeed, some countries apply the principle of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) to disciplinary
procedures. In such countries, a company’s decision to sanction the employee for failing to cooperate
may prevent the company from later terminating the employee for the misconduct should the evidence
reveal the employee was involved. In France, it appears that an employer discovering misconduct or gross
misconduct cannot sanction an employee unless the employer begins the dismissal process within two
months of becoming aware of the misconduct. Matthew Cowie & Karen Coppens, Multi-Jurisdictional
Criminal Investigations—Emerging Good Practice in Anglo-French Investigations, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 2018, supra note 139,
at 4, 6. In Belgium, an employer who has received a credible allegation of misconduct against an
employee whom he would like to discipline has only three working days to inform the employee of the
factual basis for dismissal and then to discuss it with the employee. The clock begins running before the
firm completes its investigation. Carl Bevernage, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAWS 3-1, 3-28 (William L. Keller et al. eds., 2009). In Italy, an employer seeking to terminate an
employee is required to provide written notice to the employee of his misconduct as soon as the employer
detects a violation. The employee has five days to reply. Only then may the employer decide whether to
terminate, if warranted. Bruno Cova & Francesca Petronio, Italy, in THE EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN
AND AFRICAN INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW 2017 34, 37 (2017).
148. In Germany, where discipline is intended to protect the employer from future harm, delay can
undermine the employer’s claim that dismissal is needed. Moreover, for an extraordinary dismissal, the
employer has to act within two weeks after receiving knowledge of the grounds for dismissal.
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 626 (Ger.). In Austria, employees are entitled to
expeditious and thorough investigation of any matter that might lead to their discipline. Australian courts
disfavor terminations following lengthy investigations. See, e.g., Camilleri v IBM Austl Ltd [2014] FWC
5894 (Austl.).
149. Dervan, supra note 124, at 380–81. For example, in Italy, employees are entitled to have a
union representative present at any meeting to discuss dismissal or are entitled to have the works counsel
informed. Di Garbo et al., supra note 143, at 270–71. In Germany, the company may be required to inform
any existing works counsel about an employee interview both before and after the interview and consider
input of the works counsel when making any disciplinary decision. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG]
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For example, Swiss courts have held that firms interviewing employees
accused of misconduct must afford them rights equivalent to those in
criminal investigations, including the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, a confrontation right, access to internal investigation files, and a right
against employer threats.150 Under Austrian labor laws, employers owe
employees a duty of care that may require them to inform employees about
their right to counsel when the employer and employee have divergent
interests.151 In several countries, such as England, Germany, and France, bar
rules provide that lawyers conducting interviews on behalf of employers
should inform employees about their right to counsel and ensure that
employees understand that their statements may be given to authorities and
used against them.152
2. Legal Privileges and Role of Counsel
As discussed in Part II, the breadth and reliability of U.S. legal privilege
protections encourage companies to detect and robustly investigate
misconduct by shielding evidence gathered by lawyers from compelled
disclosure to others.153 Of course, such laws also can reduce the value of
[Works Constitution Act], Jan. 19, 1972, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 18, 2019, BGBL I at 2651, §
80(2) (Ger.); Peter Schrader et al., Auskunft durch den Arbeitnehmer: Was darf er? Was muss er?
[Information by the Employee: What Is He Allowed to Do? What Does He Have to Do?], in NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT [NZA] 965, 970 (2018). See also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 69,
at 404. While the employee is not entitled to have the works counsel present, the works counsel can advise
the employee before the interview.
150. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 4, 2016, 4A_694/2015 (Switz.).
151. Knoetzl, supra note 133, at 647. In Germany, by contrast, the employee is not entitled to have
a lawyer present unless the company calls in an external attorney. Arbeitsgericht [ArbG] Hamm [Labor
Court of Hamm] May 23, 2001, 14 Sa 497/01 (Ger.). Nevertheless, in practice employers allow
employees to have lawyers of their choice present, particularly if employment may be at stake. See
STELLUNGNAHME
DER
BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER:
THESEN
DER
BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER ZUM UNTERNEHMENSANWALT IM STRAFRECHT [OPINION OF THE
FEDERAL LAW OFFICIAL CHAMBER: THESES OF THE FEDERAL LAW COUNCIL TO THE CORPORATE
LAWYER IN CRIMINAL LAW] 10 (2010) (Ger.) [hereinafter THESES OF THE FEDERAL LAW COUNCIL]. In
extraordinary circumstances, courts have precluded an employer from disciplining an employee for
misconduct when the employee was denied a confidant during initial interviews. See Arbeitsgericht [AB]
Berlin [Berlin Labor Court] July 28, 2005, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1703, 2008
(Ger.).
152. See, e.g., THESES OF THE FEDERAL LAW COUNCIL, supra note 151 (discussing Germany);
Thomas Baudesson & Charles-Henri Boeringer, Internal Investigations in France—New Practices, New
Challenges, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ÉTHIQUEDES AFFAIRES 1, 3 (2017)
(discussing Paris bar rules); Charlot et al., supra note 141, at 146 (same). In England, Outcome 11.1 of
the SRA Code of Conduct 2011 provides that a solicitor must not take unfair advantage of third parties
in either a professional or personal capacity. Particular care is required when the person is implicated in
misconduct and does not have legal representation. Solicitors are expected to caution the employee about
the potentially incriminatory nature of the interview and, if the interview reveals that the employee is
implicated, should suspend the interview in order for the employee to obtain counsel. See Charlot et al.,
supra note 141, at 163; Day & Hodges, supra note 128, at 103, 112–13, 123. Compare R v. Twaites
(1991) 92 Cr. App. R 106 (Eng.), with R v. Welcher [2007] EWCA Crim. 480 (Eng.).
153. The lack of privilege may deter investigations less in countries with little risk of private
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cooperation to the government. Because companies cannot selectively waive
privilege only with public enforcers, cooperating firms generally provide
investigative summaries but not the raw products of interviews.
The balance can be very different overseas, where corporations may
have less incentive to conduct broad investigations, particularly of
undisclosed misconduct, because privilege protections tend to be much
narrower. On the other hand, prosecutors may derive greater benefit from
interviews that are conducted by firms because prosecutors may be able to
obtain full access to recordings or transcripts as a result of narrower
privileges or policies granting or requiring selective waiver as a prerequisite
to credit for cooperation.154
Internal investigations are especially risky in countries such as China
that do not recognize legal privilege.155 Many other countries recognize
privilege in some circumstances but do not apply it to the lawyers best
positioned to initially investigate and interpret preliminary evidence of
potential misconduct at the lowest cost: in-house counsel.156
litigation or with other barriers to private litigants acquiring information, such as restrictive discovery
rules or state-secrets privileges affecting state-owned enterprises.
154. The Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom, for example, is granted significant power
under Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act. See Criminal Justice Act 1987, c. 38, § 2 (U.K.).
155. See, e.g., Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y 2013); SUSAN
E. BRUNE & ERIN C. DOUGHERTY, REPRESENTING INDIVIDUALS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 38,
43 (2016), https://www.brunelaw.com/publications/2016-10-20-representing-individuals-in-internationa
l-investigations/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Brune_Representing_Individuals_Sept-Oct_2016.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/Q78D-4N8W]. Although China does not recognize legal privilege Chinese law governing
lawyers does impose on lawyers a duty of confidentiality in many situations. Nevertheless, this duty does
not apply to information about a past or contemplated crime that severely impacts national or public
security or causes serious personal injury. In addition, in China, parties and their lawyers may be
compelled to testify in administrative investigations and proceedings. Moreover, the right of lawyers
representing clients in criminal proceedings to keep matters confidential does not apply to in-house
counsel or unregistered foreign lawyers. Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson, Safeguarding Confidential
Communication in China, LAW 360 (Mar. 25, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/77
3074/safeguarding-confidential-communication-in-china [https://perma.cc/SHZ6-UAVJ].
In some countries, legal privilege does not attach if a firm hires a lawyer to determine whether
the firm has adhered to compliance duties imposed on it by law, on the grounds that compliance duties
are not typical activities of a lawyer. Thus, a financial institution hiring counsel to determine whether the
anti-money laundering laws have been violated may be unable to shield the investigation under legal
privilege. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 21, 2018, 1B_433/2017, § 4.5
(Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 16, 2016, 1B_85/2016, § 6.1 (Switz.).
156. In many European countries, privilege applies only to communications with an independent
lawyer. In-house counsel are not seen as independent. E.g., BRUNE & DOUGHERTY, supra note 155, at
43–44; Dervan, supra note 124, at 370–71. These jurisdictions include Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Julia Holtz, Legal Profession Privilege in Europe: A Missed Policy Opportunity, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION
L. & PRAC. 402, 405 (2013). See also Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chem. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R.
I-08301, I-08368 (ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union that applicable legal privilege
does not extend to legal advice given by in-house counsel or non-EU qualified lawyers); Borsodi &
Burrus, supra note 127, at 665, 671; Charlot et al., supra note 141, at 161; Alexei Dudko, Russia, in THE
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 633, 641; Krakow & Petsche,
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Moreover, in many countries, legal advice privilege protects only
communications with a small subset of employees: those who have authority
to represent, and make legal decisions for, the company for purposes of the
attorney-client relationship.157 External counsel’s communications with
other employees, including those with direct evidence about the wrongdoing,
are not protected. For example, in England, the Court of Appeals, in Director
of the Serious Fraud Office v. Eurasian Natural Resources Ltd., held that
legal advice privilege applies only to company lawyers’ communications
with company employees “specifically tasked with seeking and receiving
legal advice” on behalf of the company.158 Similarly, in Italy, legal advice
privilege applies only to employees who have the power to represent the
company.159
In addition, work product privileges can be narrower than in the United
States, leaving some internal investigations unprotected. England’s version
of the doctrine is called the litigation privilege. A company claiming this
privilege must show that it was “aware of circumstances which rendered
litigation between [itself] and a particular person or class of persons a real
likelihood rather than a mere possibility.”160 In Eurasian Natural Resources
Ltd., the Court of Appeals held that documents, including interview notes,
created in the course of an internal investigation, are protected by the
litigation privilege only if the firm’s dominant purpose is to obtain evidence
in relation to, or to advise on, actual or contemplated litigation, including
efforts to avoid or settle such litigation.161 Importantly, the decision suggests
that litigation privilege would not apply to internal investigations into
supra note 144, at 46; Lach et al., supra note 143, at 575. In addition, many countries restrict legal
privilege to communications with external lawyers registered with the bar in that country. See BRUNE &
DOUGHERTY, supra note 155, at 43–44.
157. This is akin to the “control group” test that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in the Upjohn
decision as insufficiently protective to allow corporate lawyers to gather necessary facts. See Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
158. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office v. Eurasian Nat. Res. Ltd., [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2006 (Eng.)
[hereinafter ENRC]. The Court of Appeals in ENRC recognized the rationales against narrow privileges
but stated that it was constrained to follow a prior ruling of the House of Lords. Notably, the SFO and
FCA often insist that firms waive the privilege and provide full transcripts of employee interviews.
England does recognize selective waiver, however. Amanda Raad et al., Self-Reporting to the Authorities
and Other Disclosure Obligations: The UK Perspective, in THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 110, at 42.
159. See Cova & Petronio, supra note 147, at 36.
160. United States v. Philip Morris Inc. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 330 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
161. The firm had conducted an internal investigation following a whistleblower report, expecting
to self-report to the SFO with hope of obtaining a DPA. The lower court concluded that the company
could not claim litigation privilege because an internal inquiry conducted without a pending government
investigation, with the intent to avoid litigation under the SFO’s policy favoring leniency for selfreporting, was not prepared in anticipation of likely litigation, and thus was not covered by the litigation
privilege. Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office v. Eurasian Nat. Res. Corp. [2017] EWHC 1017 (QB) (Eng.);
see also RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2016] EWHC 3161 (Ch) (Eng.).
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misconduct the government has not detected if the firm investigating neither
planned to self-report nor expected enforcement authorities to detect the
misconduct.
Germany does not recognize traditional attorney-client and work
product privileges. Instead, prosecutors’ ability to obtain information from
lawyers about their clients is governed by criminal procedure statutes.162
Under these laws, external lawyers are entitled to maintain the
confidentiality of client information and thus cannot be called to testify
against a client.163 However, German prosecutors may seize materials from
lawyers offices, including evidence generated during an internal
investigation, in certain circumstances.164 Authorities are prohibited from
seizing either notes of conversations or written correspondence between a
lawyer and a client, as well as defense materials, if the materials relate to the
defense of a person whom the attorney represents in a criminal matter, or, in
the case of a corporation, an administrative action threatening financial
sanctions.165 Yet prosecutors may be free to seize the results of a lawyer’s
internal investigation conducted on behalf of the corporation if the materials
were not prepared to defend the corporation from charges, for example
because the prosecutors’ investigation is targeted at someone other than the
corporate client, such as an employee or subsidiary.166
162. There is less risk of disclosure in civil proceedings in Germany. In civil proceedings, courts
usually dismiss motions for production of documentary evidence by opposing parties because German
civil procedure follows the principle of production of evidence by the party who bears the burden of
proof, that is, it is within every party’s responsibility to obtain the evidence necessary to substantiate its
claims, and, in principle, to bear the risk for failing to do so. HANS-JOACHIM MUSIELAK & WOLFGANG
VOIT, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (ZPO) [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 142, para. 8 (15th ed. 2018).
163. STRAFPROZESSORIG (STPO) [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 53, para. 1, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html [https://perma.cc/9UBT-JBRU]
(Ger.).
164. The Federal Constitutional Court recently concluded that the more general protections against
prosecutors seeking evidence from lawyers do not extend to the seizure of objects such as documents.
Lawyers’ protection against document seizure is covered by German Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. §
97, para. 1; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG,] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 27, 2018,
2 BvR 1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, para. 78–79 (Ger.).
165. Id.; see STRAFPROZEIDNUNG (STPO) [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 97, para. 1,
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html [https://perma.cc/9U
BT-JBRU] (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Judgement of 25 February, 1998
- 3 StR 490/97, BGHSt 44, 46 (Ger.). For a comprehensive discussion of the decision’s implications, see
Michael Hippeli, Hoheitliche Eingriffsmaßnahmen gegen deutsche Büros internationaler Kanzleien:
Bedarf für ein Legal Privilege? [Sovereign Intervention Measures Against German Offices of
International Law Firms: Need for a Legal Privilege?], 2018 GWR 383 (Ger.). Section 97 has been
interpreted to apply only to materials prepared to defend a client subject to criminal charges. In Germany,
corporations cannot be held criminally liable, but they are subject to administrative sanctions that
resemble criminal liability in other countries; many provisions of the German Code of Criminal Procedure
apply to these proceedings. See Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] [Law on Misdemeanors],
repromulgated Feb. 19, 1987, BGBL I § 46(1) (Ger.).
166. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 27, 2018, 2 BvR
1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, para. 79 (Ger.); Regional Court of Hamburg, judgement of 15 October, 2010,
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German courts tend to use a balancing test to assess the validity of such
searches. The public interest in effective prosecution normally tips the scale
in favor of allowing a search.167 Applying these principles, the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany recently rejected challenges to prosecutors’
seizure of materials from the Jones Day law firm, which was representing
Volkswagen (“VW”), for use against VW executives. The court concluded
that the seizure was permissible because VW was not formally accused of an
offense, the government had probable cause to search for evidence against
the targets of its investigation based on evidence contained in guilty pleas in
the United States, and the case involved widespread material misconduct.168
Overseas regimes governing the conduct of lawyers may also inhibit,
more than in the United States, the ability of corporations to select, fund, and
communicate with counsel for individual employees. For example,
according to English practitioners, lawyers involved in business crime cases
do not reach the question of whether joint defense agreements are advisable
(even if they would be of value under narrower privilege laws) because
corporate counsel will be inhibited from discussing the facts with counsel for
individuals for fear that it might be treated as “interference with the due
administration of justice” or “contempt of court.”169
608 Qs 18/10; Regional Court of Bonn (“LG Bonn”), 21 June, 2012 - 27 Qs 2/12 NZWiSt 2013, 21
(Section 97 only applies if the client was already accused of a crime when the potentially incriminating
material is obtained, and finding that a subsidiary is not necessarily represented by the attorney that
represents the parent company). This situation can easily occur in Germany because corporations can be
sanctioned under Section 30 OWiG for criminal or administrative misconduct by an employee only if the
employee was (1) chairman of the executive committee of an association without legal capacity or a
member of such committee; (2) an authorized representative with full power of attorney or in a managerial
position as procura-holder or an authorized representative with a commercial power of attorney of a legal
person; or (3) another person responsible on behalf of management for the operation or enterprise forming
part of a legal person, which also covers supervision of the conduct of business, or other exercise of
controlling powers in a managerial position. “Misconduct” of such a person can consist in the lack of
proper supervision of any other employee who then committed a crime or administrative infraction. See
Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG] [Law on Misdemeanors], repromulgated Feb. 19, 1987,
BGBL I § 130 (Ger.).
167. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 27, 2018, 2 BvR
1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, para. 61, 66, 67 (Ger.).
168. The Federal Constitutional Court also rejected claims by the law firm Jones Day that the search
violated its constitutional rights because, as a U.S. firm, Jones Day is not entitled to the asserted German
constitutional rights. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 27, 2018,
2 BvR 1287/17, 2 BvR 1583/17, para. 78–79 (Ger.). Similarly, in 2010, the District Court of Hamburg
held that the public authorities pursing a criminal investigation of a firm’s employees could seize internal
investigation material from a law firm because the company itself was not accused or suspected.
Landgericht [LG] Hamburg [District Court of Hamburg] Oct. 15, 2010, 608 Qs 18/10 (Ger.). In 2012, the
Bonn District Court held that prosecutors could seize material from a lawyer for a parent corporation for
use against its subsidiary because the parent was not a potential party. See Philipp von Holst, Germany,
in THE EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW 29, 31 (2017).
169. For discussion of the scope of these offenses, see ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE
& PRACTICE §§ 28-30–28-50 (P.J. Richardson ed., 2009).
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3. Monitoring and Processing of Data and Documents
Compared with the United States, companies overseas often do not
enjoy the same comparative advantage over enforcement officials in
obtaining and analyzing corporate emails and other documents. Like their
U.S. counterparts, government authorities overseas often can obtain
documents and emails from firms.170 Indeed, as a result of more restrictive
approaches to legal privilege, enforcement authorities in many countries can
obtain documents that their U.S. counterparts cannot, such as those prepared
by in-house counsel.
However, as a result of privacy laws governing data and
correspondence, companies overseas often are less able than U.S. firms to
monitor employees’ communications or freely access and process emails,
digital evidence, and documents, even when stored on the company’s servers
or devices. These laws also often cause companies to incur greater cost and
170. For example, both the SFO and the FACT have the power to compel the production of any
kind of evidence by those within their jurisdiction, including documents. Criminal Justice Act 1987, c.
38, § 2(3) (U.K.). In addition, the SFO can obtain evidence by turning to the police to use extensive search
and seizure powers, albeit with a warrant. See generally Christine Braamskamp & Kelly Hagedorn, KBR
Inc.: Foreign Companies Can Now Be Compelled to Produce Documents to the UK Serious Fraud Office,
N.Y.U.: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 12, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcem
ent/2018/09/12/kbr-inc-foreign-companies-can-now-be-compelled-to-produce-documents-to-the-ukserious-fraud-office [https://perma.cc/D8Y4-QTKM].
In Germany, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (“BaFin”) can demand documents
and emails from companies for the purpose of exercising its supervisory duties. See
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act] Sept. 9, 1998, Federal Law Gazette I at 2708,
last amended by Article 2 of the Law Implementing the EC Deposit Guarantee Directive and Investor
Compensation Directive of 16 July 1998, Federal Law Gazette I at 1842, § 6 (Ger.); Kreditwesengesetz
[KWG] [German Banking Act] Sept. 9, 1998, Federal Law Gazette I at 2776, last amended by Article 3
of the Act amending insolvency and banking law provisions (Gesetz zur Anderung insolvenzrechtlicher
und kreditwesenrechtlicher Vorschriften*) of December 8, 1999, Federal Law Gazette I No. 54 at 2384,
§ 6 (Ger.). BaFin also can compel employees of regulated entities to produce documents even if it would
expose them to criminal or administrative liability. An implicated employee’s compelled production may
not be introduced as evidence against him in criminal proceedings, but derivative use is permitted. See,
e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 13, 1981 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW] 1431, 1981 (Ger.); Uwe H. Schneider, Investigative Maßnahmen und
Informationsweitergabe im konzernfreien Unternehmen und im Konzern, [Investigative Measures and
Information Dissemination in the Group-free Company and in the Group], in NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 1201, 1203 (2010); see also Becker et al., supra note 144, at 248.
Overseas prosecutors often have more leeway to conduct a search because they face a less
robust exclusionary rule if the search is defective. Many countries employ a balancing test—balancing
the individual’s rights against the state’s interest in sanctioning the crime—to determine whether to
exclude illegally obtained evidence. In addition, a number of jurisdictions do not extend exclusion to
evidence derived from an illegal search (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) or exclude derivative evidence only
in limited circumstances. See STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
CASEBOOK APPROACH 118–124 (2d ed. 2008); Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note
109, at 280, 286–88. See generally Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Thomas Weigend, The Purpose and
Functions of Exclusionary Rules: A Comparative Overview, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A
FAIR TRIAL?: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENTIARY RULES 255 (2019) (discussing Spain,
Germany, and Switzerland).
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face more restrictions when accessing and processing records during an
investigation.171 In addition, financial institutions in some countries may be
impeded from conducting adequate internal investigations by bank secrecy
or state secrets laws.
a. Data Privacy Laws
Overseas companies often cannot freely monitor employees’
communications or assess and evaluate documents and digital evidence, even
when stored on the company’s servers or computers, if employees’
communications include personal communications, or if, as is inevitable,
their work-related communications include personal data.
A company cannot freely process emails and electronic documents in
countries with strong privacy protections, such as France, if employees use
company-provided computers and email accounts for personal purposes.172
Instead, companies often must incur the added cost of hiring a third-party to
sort through emails and other documents to remove materials the firm is not
authorized to access—an added cost that may be material to a smaller or
medium-size firm deciding whether to investigate potential misconduct that
it is not confident occurred.
Beyond this, companies face limitations on their ability to process
work-related emails and documents because these inevitably contain
personal data, often of both an employee and a third party. In this situation,
the company needs a legitimate basis for processing that data and faces
potential notice requirements.
171. In addition to data privacy laws, many countries have laws protecting the secrecy of
correspondence, such as letters, phone calls, and electronic communications. These provisions guarantee
the secrecy of closed correspondence. They can impede a company’s access to evidence in its employees’
offices or work computers if the employee is allowed to make incidental personal use of company
facilities. In this case, the company must get the employee’s informed consent which can be withdrawn
at any time. John P Carlin, et al., Data Privacy and Transfers in Cross-Border Investigations, in AM.
INVESTIGATIONS REV. 2020 1, 9 (2020).
172. In France, an employer seeking to collect all employee emails during an investigation needs to
satisfy several requirements. First, the company must verify that the company’s internal policies clearly
state and notify employees that the employers’ email accounts are corporate property. If employees are
allowed to use their company accounts for personal emails, then the company must separate personal
from company emails. Employees have a strong right of privacy in emails marked personal. Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., May 30, 2007, 05/43102 (Fr.). Second, the
firm would need to get prior approval from the French data collection authority, the Commission
Nationale de L’Informatique et des Libertes (“CNIL”). Third, the firm would have to inform the work
council and other labor committees. See Charlot et al., supra note 141, at 146–47. Similarly, in Austria a
company that permits employees to use computers or email for private purposes must exclude resulting
personal data from its processing, aside from spot checks. Knoetzl, supra note 133, at 647, 661.
Employees in Canada also may have an expectation of privacy in personal information stored on
workplace computers or devices. R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.R. 34 (Can.).
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Under the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”),173 which
establishes minimum standards for European Union (“EU”) countries,
“personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person.”174 Email accounts are personalized if the email
address includes an employee’s name. Data on a company laptop or desktop
may be personal if company devices are assigned to individual employees.175
Even personal identifying information in travel vouchers, requests for
reimbursement, corporate contracts, and the like may be considered personal
data. Personal data also includes names, email addresses, and other
information of individuals outside the firm who are named in company
documents.176
Under the GDPR, a company engages in “processing” of data if it
performs “any operation or set of operations . . . on personal data or on sets
of personal data.”177 As a result, a company analyzing corporate emails and
other electronic records during an investigation invariably will be processing
“personal information” of employees and third-parties, as that term is
defined by both the GDPR and country-specific data privacy laws.178
Companies can process personal data if they obtain either subjects’
voluntary affirmative consent to process data for the specific purpose
intended or have a legitimate justification.179 Companies generally cannot
rely on blanket consent inserted in an employee contract or handbook to
173. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, On the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
[hereinafter GDPR]. The GDPR directly affects law in each member state but only sets a floor. In the
European Union, individuals’ right to protection of personal data is deemed to be a fundamental right.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8(1), Dec 13,
2007, 2007 O.J.
174. GDPR, supra note 173, at art. 4, para. 1.
175. For a discussion of Switzerland, see Livschitz, supra note 133. French law also prohibits a firm
from accessing employees’ email and information on computers in employees’ possession, even when
the firm owns both, if email accounts are personalized and electronic devices are individually assigned,
unless the firm has a legitimate basis and proper procedures are employed. Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] soc., May 17, 2005, Bull. civ. V, No. 165 (Fr.); Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull. civ. V, No. 291. (Fr.).
176. Michelle Bramley et al., Investigations in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 107, at 110, 143.
177. GDPR, supra note 173, at art. 4, para. 2.
178. The EU and member countries are not the only ones that restrict the processing of personal
data. In Switzerland, efforts to screen email accounts for relevant information involve the processing of
employees’ personal information and fall under Swiss data protection rules, assuming that the email
accounts are personalized (as is the case if the email address involves the employees’ name). Some
jurisdictions outside the EU, such as South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Columbia, also require
affirmative opt-in consent. Carlin et al., supra note 171.
179. Failure to comply with GDPR leads to administrative fines up to 10,000,00 EUR (approx.
11,400,00 U.S. Dollars), or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2 percent of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. See GDPR, supra note 173, at art. 83, sec.
4.
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justify either widespread monitoring or access to employee emails for an
investigation. Broad consent arguably does not satisfy the GDPR’s
requirement that the subject affirmatively consent to the specific purpose for
which the data will be processed. Consent also must be truly voluntary.180
As a result, corporations in countries such as Germany and France tend not
to rely on consent because employees must be expressly asked for it, must
be able to refuse without risk of sanction, and can withdraw it at any time.181
Moreover, in the corporate investigation context, courts tend to assume that
such consent is involuntary because of the imbalance of power between the
employer and employee, unless the employee derived legal or economic
benefit from the consent.182
Absent consent, companies may process personal data if they have a
statutorily-defined legitimate purpose. Processing is justified if necessary to
comply with a legal obligation imposed by the EU or a member state, or if
“necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests” pursued by the
company, as long as those interests are not “overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.”183
These justifications often are interpreted narrowly. In particular, in
many countries neither justification provides companies carte blanche to
engage in ongoing monitoring of employees absent a reasonable suspicion
180. Jim Halpert et al., The GDPR’s Impact on Internal Investigations, DLA PIPER (July 10, 2018),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2018/07/global-anticorruption-newsletter/thegdpr-impact-investigations [https://perma.cc/L9X4-KGVJ] (explaining that under the GDPR, the risk of
criminal law violations does not justify relying on consent, absent a related national law requiring
consent); see also Carlin et al., supra note 171.
181. von Holst, supra note 168, at 29; Myria Saarinen et al, Data Protection in France: Overview,
THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/data-prote
ction-in-france-overview [https://perma.cc/8NMP-DAW5] (French data protection laws assumes
employees cannot freely consent).
182. Section 26(2) of Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act provides:
If personal data of employees are processed on the basis of consent, then the employee’s level
of dependence in the employment relationship and the circumstances under which consent was
given shall be taken into account in assessing whether such consent was freely given. Consent
may be freely given in particular if it is associated with a legal or economic advantage for the
employee, or if the employer and employee are pursuing the same interests. Consent shall be
given in written form, unless a different form is appropriate because of special circumstances.
The employer shall inform the employee in text form of the purpose of data processing and of
the employee’s right to withdraw consent pursuant to Article 7 (3) of Regulation (EU)
2016/679.
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003 BGBL I at § 26(2) (Ger.).
In the United Kingdom, guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office indicates that
consent is less likely to be deemed to have been given freely when there is a significant imbalance of
power, such as between employer and employees. See Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/g
uide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr [https://perma.cc/8WLV-KJXS].
183. Supra note 179; see also Halpert et al., supra note 180.
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that misconduct occurred or a need to monitor for safety reasons.184
Monitoring is one tool that gives companies an advantage relative to
outsiders in detecting misconduct. Data privacy laws also can impede
companies from conducting prophylactic investigations based on
misconduct detected by other firms in the same industry or an internal report
from an employee that does not suffice to create reasonable suspicion.
The GDPR could negatively impact an investigation even when the
company has evidence of misconduct. In the early stages of an investigation,
companies often need to sort through massive amounts of emails and
documents involving employees whom the company will later conclude
were not implicated. Companies cannot be confident that their legitimate
interests in legal compliance justify the processing of personal data of many
uninvolved employees. Given the liability risks for failure to comply with
the GDPR, companies in Europe can be expected to be less proactive than in
the United States in examining employee communications, which may
reduce their ability to detect and prove misconduct.185
184. For example, in Germany the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (“BDSG” or “Federal Data Protection
Act”) permits companies to monitor employees’ emails under some circumstances, but does not favor
broad ongoing monitoring. See Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14,
2003 BGBL at 66 (Ger.). The law governs data processing for the purpose of both detecting, id. § 26(1)
sent. 2, and preventing criminal misconduct. Id. § 26(1) sent. 1. In order to justify data processing to
detect misconduct, the company must both suspect that the employee engaged in misconduct and have
tangible facts that support a “concrete suspicion of crime.” This provision does not allow for secret
monitoring “into the blue.” Id. § 26(1) sent. 2. In addition to needing a concrete suspicion, a court will
apply an overarching reasonableness test to determine whether (1) the data is suitable for the employer’s
purpose, (2) the data is necessary, in the sense that there is no less restrictive means to serve the same
purpose, and (3) the monitoring is reasonable after balancing the employer’s interest in receiving the
information with employees’ right to privacy. See id. § 26(1) sent. 1; ERFURTER KOMMENTAR ZUM
ARBEISTRECHT [ERFK] [COMMENT ON LABOR LAW] § 26, para. 9, 10 and 11 (20th ed. 2020). France is
also hostile to ongoing surveillance by companies of employees, consistent with the country’s historical
preference for granting the government a monopoly on surveillance. See Jacqueline Ross, The
Surveillance State, the Private Surveillance Sector, and the Monopoly of Legitimate Stealth: Nineteenth
Century Pathways to Undercover Policing in the United States and France (2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors). In Greece, employee monitoring is illegal and can be prosecuted.
Christine Pirovolakis, Greece Puts Stop to E-mail Snooping in Decision by Data Protection Authority,
PRIVACY LAW WATCH (Feb. 7, 2005). In England a legitimate interest in processing data may require
that a company reasonably suspects misconduct occurred based on documented facts, that the processing
is necessary to achieve that interest, and that it is reasonably based on a balancing of the interests of the
individual and the firm. Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), supra note 182.
Companies outside of Europe also face restrictions on their ability to monitor their employees’
emails and other activities. For example, in Argentina, the National Court on Criminal and Correctional
Matters ruled that even if an employer has a disclosed policy of monitoring emails, it cannot do so without
violating its employees’ privacy rights unless the monitoring is under control of the courts. See Mariela
Inés Melhem et al., Argentina: Current Anti-Corruption Landscape, in THE INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW OF
THE AMERICAS 2018, supra note 133, at 45, 48 (Glob. Investigations Review ed., 2017).
185. Halpert et al., supra note 180. By contrast, the United Kingdom adopted the Data Protection
Act of 2018, which regulates processing falling within U.K. national law instead of EU law. This Act
clarifies that certain categories of data (including criminal convictions) may be processed to prevent or
detect unlawful acts, protect the public against dishonesty, and prevent fraud, among other reasons. Data
Protection Act 2018, c. 12 (Eng.).

752

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:697

Even with adequate justification, companies in Europe must comply
with the requirement that the individual whose data is processed be informed
about, and generally be allowed to object to, the processing. Companies
seeking to process such information may need to provide notice to third
parties whose personal data—such as in contracts, invoices, and the like—
are in the company’s hands.186 This requirement may reduce companies’
incentives and ability to investigate potential misconduct not yet detected by
authorities.187
b. Financial Secrecy Laws
Some countries, such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Singapore,
provide heightened protection for personal data of customers of financial
institutions. Such rules may preclude transferring customer information
outside the country, even to another office of the firm or to the firm’s internal
investigators. To comply with such laws, external investigators often must
set up operations contained within the firm, increasing costs of investigation.
Investigations also may be hampered by the inability to share customerspecific information with employees or agents of the company in other
countries, absent permission from the relevant authorities. 188
In sum, in light of much greater legal restrictions overseas,189
186. See GDPR, supra note 173, art. 12–23; see also Halpert et al., supra note 180; Caroline Krass
et al., The General Data Protection Regulation: A Primer for U.S.-Based Organizations that Handle EU
Personal Data, N.Y.U.: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 11, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/complian
ce_enforcement/2017/12/11/the-general-data-protection-regulation-a-primer-for-u-s-based-organization
s-that-handle-eu-personal-data [https://perma.cc/5ALY-NDQP].
187. Prior to the GDPR, companies also wanting to investigate misconduct about which
enforcement authorities were unaware often had to contend with a requirement that they notify data
protection authorities before processing personal data. This notification requirement has been replaced
by the requirement to designate a “data protection officer,” pursuant to Article. 37 of the GDPR, who
must be consulted prior to the processing of personal data. See GDPR, supra note 173, art. 36. The
notification obligation under Directive 95/46/EC has been replaced by a recordkeeping obligation. See
id. art. 30; see also Alex von Walter, Germany, in INT’L COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDES: DATA
PROTECTION 2019 136 (6th ed., 2019), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/comparative_legal_gu
ide_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8PX-PFJN].
188. E.g., Catherine Di Lorenzo & Thomas Berger, Luxembourg, in DATA PRIVACY AND TRANSFER
IN INVESTIGATIONS (discussing the Luxembourg Act of April 5, 1993), https://globalinvestigationsrevie
w.com/jurisdiction/1006205/luxembourg [https://perma.cc/68NA-BEA9]; Flavio Romerio et. al.,
Switzerland, in 2 THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 488, 492 (Judith Seddon et.
al ed, 4th ed. 2020) (under Swiss banking law, banks may not disclose personal data relating to current
or former clients and presumptively may not send it to be processed overseas to entities in countries
lacking adequate data privacy regulation). See generally DELOITTE, THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR
FIGHTING FINANCIAL CRIME: ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES 22, n. 35 (2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tw/Documents/financial-services/tw-the-global-frame
work-for-fighting-financial-crime-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B9U-JJ8K] (noting that certain jurisdictions,
like Singapore, limit information-sharing by financial institutions even within a corporate group, although
Singapore is relaxing the constraints on sharing information to enforce anti-money laundering laws).
189. In addition, some countries have state secrecy laws that can impinge on internal investigations,
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corporations do not have nearly the same power as firms in the United States
to assist enforcers with data collection and processing, as described in Part
II. Thus, there is less for enforcers to gain in offering reduced sanctions for
corporate cooperation—particularly if it arrives late in the investigation.
IV. IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL DIFFERENCES ON EFFECTIVE
CORPORATE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The model of corporate criminal enforcement that U.S. prosecutors
have sought to exploit has the potential to produce public benefits under
certain conditions. The model, if properly implemented, potentially benefits
society by shifting the primary task of detecting and investigating
misconduct to the party that can most effectively undertake these activities
at the lowest cost: the corporation. Society gains to the extent that
enforcement policy induces corporations to detect and self-report
misconduct, thereby enabling public authorities to detect and sanction more
corporate misconduct, and do so more rapidly, than they otherwise could.
If enforcement policy induces companies to cooperate by obtaining and
sharing evidence that prosecutors likely would not have obtained on their
own, social benefits further increase. Corporate cooperation thus can allow
prosecution of more individual violators, and sanctioning and remediation of
more corporations, than if only prosecutorial resources were available to
address the problem of business crime.190 Deterrence of business crime
should rise, as long as prosecutors, in implementing such an enforcement
program, are effective in ensuring that firms, and especially senior managers,
follow through honestly and fully on their obligations to self-report,
cooperate (including in assisting in prosecution of individual violators), and
remediate.
However, the use of such an enforcement policy to induce corporate
detection and investigation, while reducing corporate sanctions, generally
enhances welfare only if companies are better able to detect or investigate
than the government. After all, the U.S. approach to corporate enforcement
is not costless. Corporate primacy in investigations creates the risk of
excessive corporate influence over government investigations and resulting
enforcement actions, particularly if enforcement authorities lack the
resources and will to conduct robust independent investigations. Moreover,
corporations are induced to investigate and cooperate by lower sanctions—
lower sanctions that risk undermining corporate deterrence if they do not
particularly by companies, such as banks, that are repositories of private information of many state-owned
enterprises.
190. See Arlen, supra note 6; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 688–95; see also Daniel C.
Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 (2014).
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sufficiently enhance detection of misconduct and enforcement. Therefore, it
would be difficult to justify an approach like that of U.S. prosecutors if it did
not induce detection and investigation by a more effective investigative
entity, rather than simply enabling private funding of investigations that
might be less effective than ones prosecutors would conduct.
This Article’s principal contribution is to show that other countries’
decisions about how to structure enforcement policy should account for legal
rules governing investigations that materially impact the expected public
benefits from U.S.-style models of corporate enforcement. This Part
discusses conditions in which differences in the law governing corporate
investigations are most likely to matter and the policy implications that
follow from such differences—both for other nations and for continued
domestic debate about how to improve upon the U.S. approach.
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
Criminal resolutions that offer a more favorable form of settlement and
lower sanctions to both companies that self-report and those that cooperate
represent a calculated trade-off: they accept some reduction in companies’
incentives to prevent misconduct as the cost of enhancing companies’
incentives to help enforcement authorities sanction misconduct. This policy
promotes deterrence—both by speeding detection and remediation and
enhancing the deterrent impact of individual sanctions—as long as
enforcement policy is properly structured and the law governing corporate
investigations leaves corporations better able to detect or investigate
misconduct than government officials, independent of resource concerns.
The analysis in Part III reveals that this condition is not necessarily met
around the world. Legal doctrines in many countries grant prosecutors
greater power to compel witness cooperation, and greater access to corporate
documents and electronic evidence than in the United States. Moreover,
firms operating overseas regularly have less ability to detect misconduct by
monitoring employees ex ante, investigating in response to misconduct
detected in other companies, or using in-house counsel to investigate than
firms in the United States. Foreign firms also often face more impediments
and greater cost in investigating identified misconduct as a result of
employment laws, data privacy laws, and laws governing legal privilege.
These differences have implications for other countries considering policies
that offer non-conviction resolutions and lower sanctions for corporate
investigative efforts.
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1. Non-Trial Resolutions as a Substitute for Public Expenditures on
Enforcement
In theory, the law governing corporate investigations in some countries
could give prosecutors an unambiguous advantage over corporations in
detecting and investigating misconduct. This would be particularly likely in
a jurisdiction with legally powerful, well-resourced prosecutors, laws
impeding investigative actions by private firms, and robust laws both
protecting whistleblowers who report misconduct to authorities and
rewarding them financially for their disclosure of crime. (No jurisdiction yet
fully meets these conditions.)
In such conditions, a country might choose to allow negotiated guilty
pleas or DPAs to permit expedient resolutions, while eschewing more lenient
forms of settlement such as NPAs or declinations, or substantial sanction
mitigation designed to induce firms to detect wrongdoing, self-report, and
cooperate. Resolutions short of conviction would be justified only to
overcome barriers to settlement resulting from potential collateral
consequences to firms, and substantial sanction mitigation would be
unnecessary in agreements designed to avoid or dampen collateral
consequences.
Policies that induce corporate investigations could nevertheless
enhance enforcement efforts to the extent that legislatures restrict funding
for corporate enforcement. However, should government authorities be
better able than firms to detect and investigate, then policymakers can better
enhance social welfare by increasing resources devoted to public
enforcement, rather than using negotiated settlements to encourage selfreporting and cooperation. While the point is speculative, it could turn out
that the U.S. government has been able to hold down enforcement
expenditures largely because of corporate legal powers under U.S. law and
that fundamental differences in those powers abroad will prevent similar
budgetary approaches for other nations determined to achieve substantial
growth in corporate enforcement.
2. Structuring Enforcement Policy: Relative Credit for Self-Reporting and
Cooperation
In most countries, government authorities do not enjoy an advantage
relative to companies over all aspects of detecting and investigating
misconduct. Notwithstanding various private-law impediments to corporate
monitoring and investigations, corporations generally appear to be better
able to detect misconduct than the government due to their superior access
to information about their own activities and their ability to create effective
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internal reporting systems. Firms’ comparative detection advantage is likely
to persist as long as other countries resist adoption of effective bounty
regimes and strong whistleblower protections.191 In addition, corporations
are likely better able to investigate misconduct within their own operations
overseas than are domestic prosecutors.
Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions, properly resourced enforcement
officials could be in a better position to investigate domestic misconduct that
has been brought to their attention. Adequately funded investigators are
particularly likely to have a comparative investigative advantage in countries
that grant prosecutors the ability to compel testimony while restricting firms
from compelling testimony or broadly searching internally stored data.
Thus, some countries likely have more to gain from inducing
corporations to report undetected misconduct than from inducing corporate
investigation and cooperation with respect to previously detected
misconduct. This has implications for enforcement policy. Countries that use
negotiated settlements to induce self-reporting and cooperation face a
tradeoff between encouraging self-reporting versus cooperation following a
failure to self-report.192 Both self-reporting and cooperation enable the
government to sanction a company for misconduct that otherwise would not
have been sanctioned. Self-reporting has the greatest impact on a company’s
likelihood of being held liable.193 Thus, it imposes the greatest potential cost
on the company. Where well-funded prosecutors have robust enforcement
powers, and companies are impeded from investigating by employment and
data privacy laws, governments may benefit greatly from corporate selfreporting but gain little from inducing corporate investigations. Such
countries should ensure that the primary benefit of entering into a non-trial
resolution is reserved for companies that self-report undetected misconduct.
Given the enormous potential cost of collateral consequences of
conviction, the strongest incentive available to government authorities is the
offer of a DPA, NPA, or declination, instead of a guilty plea or trial
conviction. The benefit to a firm of avoiding debarment or exclusion often
191. Companies’ comparative advantage at detection arises in part from their ability to induce
employees to report potential misconduct internally. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 693; Arlen,
supra note 10, at 265–66; see also supra note 50 (discussing evidence that companies detect much more
misconduct than do government authorities). Governments that do not offer compensation to persons who
report misconduct cannot expect to realize high levels of reporting.
192. In theory, sanctions can be structured to ensure that companies have incentives to self-report
(and then cooperate), and also have an incentive to cooperate even if they did not self-report. Arlen &
Kraakman, supra note 11, at 703–04; Arlen, supra note 6, at 145. This approach requires imposing truly
enormous sanctions on companies that detect misconduct and fail to self-report, while offering such firms
some fine reduction if they nevertheless cooperate.
193. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 699.
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will far outweigh the impact of any fines the company might pay in a
settlement.194 The insight that the benefit of obtaining a favorable form of
settlement dwarfs the benefit of fine mitigation applies with particular force
in the many countries that impose relatively low maximum sanctions on
corporations convicted of misconduct.195
Because insulation from conviction can be the government’s strongest
source of leverage, countries that gain relatively little from corporate
cooperation should allow firms to obtain the most favorable forms of
settlement only if firms take actions that enable enforcement officials to
discover undetected misconduct, or provide material evidence the
government otherwise would not have obtained. This means they should
deviate from the U.S. approach.
U.S. policy in effect offers companies that committed widespread
misconduct or misconduct involving senior management the same form of
resolution whether they self-report and cooperate or only cooperate. Both
are likely to receive a DPA (or in some cases an NPA). Thus, the offer of a
DPA does not provide a strong incentive to self-report. Firms that self-report
are presumptively eligible for a 50 percent reduction in the fine instead of
the 25 percent reduction available to those that only cooperate. Yet this fine
mitigation is not sufficient to encourage reporting of misconduct that is likely
to remain undetected if the firm stays silent. Thus, companies detecting
serious misconduct are unlikely to self-report because they know that if the
government eventually detects the wrongdoing the company can use
cooperation to obtain a DPA or NPA as well as fine mitigation.196
By contrast, in some countries, corporate cooperation is less likely to
yield valuable evidence that prosecutors could not obtain themselves as a
result of laws that constrain corporate investigations. Such countries may
best enhance enforcement and deter misconduct by restricting access to the
most favorable forms of settlement (DPAs, NPAs, and declinations) to
companies that either self-report misconduct or report additional instances
of misconduct of which enforcers are unaware. This would both encourage
companies to share information about misconduct that they detect and give
them additional reason to implement measures to encourage employees to
194. See Arlen, supra note 6. Further research should explore the complex question of debarment
and delicensing consequences for firms convicted of crime in jurisdictions outside the United States, as
well as the effects within each active enforcement jurisdiction of criminal convictions imposed on firms
under the laws of other nations.
195. See THE LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS FOR FOREIGN BRIBERY, supra note 10 (discussing
corporate criminal liability).
196. This is so even if the firm obtains a 50 percent fine reduction for self-reporting, but only a 25
percent reduction for cooperation, as long as the risk of detection if the firm does not self-report is less
than 50 percent (less than half the risk if it reports).
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report misconduct internally.
These goals could be achieved by offering declinations (with full
disgorgement of all profits from the misconduct) to companies that selfreport, cooperate, or remediate, while allowing those that cooperate only to
obtain a DPA with little fine mitigation where conviction would trigger
mandatory but socially undesirable debarment or delicensing. When
conviction would not trigger mandatory collateral sanctions, enforcement
policy could restrict DPAs to companies that self-report previously
undetected misconduct, fully cooperate, and remediate, while requiring firms
that only cooperate to plead guilty in return for a reduced fine. Corporate
cooperation that produces evidence the government could have obtained on
its own likely would not suffice to justify use of a DPA. In the extreme
situation of a company unable to produce evidence that the government
cannot readily obtain, enforcement policy could offer little mitigation for
cooperation.197 Policy could reserve the main benefit—avoidance of
conviction—for firms that self-report, providing information prosecutors
could not obtain on their own.
3. Reforming Laws Governing Corporate Investigations
Finally, some countries might benefit from reconsidering some laws
governing corporate investigations. Some of these laws, such as those
protecting employees’ rights, arise out of deep social commitments and are
not likely candidates for change. Others, however, such as the scope of legal
privileges governing corporate investigations and rules governing
corporations’ ability to process their own documents and emails, could
warrant modification in countries where the present scope of such laws could
discourage corporate detection and investigation of harmful misconduct.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
This Article’s analysis also has implications for U.S. enforcement
policy. U.S. policy does not guarantee that companies that self-report,
cooperate, and remediate serious misconduct will fare better than those that
simply cooperate. Under current policy, companies that self-report large or
197. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 767 (optimal mitigation for policing, either selfreporting or cooperation, depends on its impact on the firm’s probability of sanction); Arlen, supra note
6, at 181 (same). To illustrate, a policy that reduces the sanction imposed on companies that self-report
and cooperate from $100 million to $50 million will not reduce the expected cost of misconduct to
companies that expect to self-report and cooperate if the decision to invest in detection, self-reporting,
and cooperation increases the expected likelihood of detection and sanction from 25 percent to 50 percent.
Absent such a policy, companies face an expected sanction of $25 million (a 25 percent chance of a $100
million fine). With the policy, companies that expect to self-report and cooperate also face an expected
sanction of $25 million (a 50 percent chance of a $50 million fine).
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wide-spread misconduct can be subject to a DPA, rather than a declination,
just like companies that cooperate. The additional fine mitigation for selfreporting is unlikely to be large enough to outweigh the cost to the company
of reporting misconduct the government is unlikely to detect on its own. The
DOJ’s decision to mute incentives to self-report in order to grant larger
incentives to cooperate likely reflects the perceived substantial benefit to
U.S. prosecutors of corporate cooperation, particularly with respect to
overseas misconduct. Nevertheless, the approach dampens companies’
incentives to self-report misconduct in cases that are likely to end in a DPA
or similar resolution.
In addition, U.S. enforcement practice does not ensure that firms
cooperate when it is most valuable to prosecutors: at the early stages of the
investigation. Instead, U.S. prosecutors have granted companies credit for
cooperation even when corporate cooperation arrives quite late in the
government’s investigation, thereby reducing the penalty to companies of
delay. This approach likely reflects the perceived benefit to prosecutors of
corporate cooperation even later in investigations. Yet each prosecutor’s
decision to award credit to benefit a single investigation undermines the
overall incentive for firms to cooperate early, when it matters most. U.S.
enforcement likely would be more effective if officials (1) reduced the
amount of cooperation credit for companies investigating overseas in
countries whose laws undermine the effectiveness, or value to U.S.
prosecutors of, corporate cooperation and (2) ensured that credit cannot be
obtained for cooperation that does not arrive until the government has
sufficient evidence to prove the crime.
In the future, U.S. authorities may find that they obtain less benefit from
corporate cooperation, particularly late-stage cooperation, than in the past.
Courts may be restricting companies’ ability to fully share the benefits of
investigations without waiving privileges.198 Reforms to data privacy laws
in the United States could impact corporate investigations. In addition, U.S.
prosecutors may gain less from inducing corporate investigations overseas
because of both the rise of parallel investigations by overseas authorities and
the negative impact on overseas investigations of data privacy and secrecy
laws, as well as blocking statutes that can preclude companies from sharing
the results of investigations with overseas authorities without domestic
permission. To the extent that U.S. prosecutors both benefit from
information obtained by foreign prosecutors199 and obtain less benefit from
198. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Herrera, 324 F.R.D. 258, 258 (S.D. Fla. 2017)
199. See United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (reversing criminal convictions in the
Libor scandal on the ground that testimony in federal court in the United States had been tainted, in
violation of the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, by witness’s exposure to defendants’ compelled
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inducing cooperation by companies operating overseas, they may wish to
restrict companies’ ability to benefit from pure cooperation that does not
provide information the government could not have readily obtained. This
would have the effect of enhancing the relative benefit of self-reporting prior
to cooperating.
Finally, analysis of laws overseas reveals that the United States could
potentially benefit from reforming laws governing legal privileges to allow
for selective waiver permitting companies to disclose to government
authorities while otherwise retaining privileges. This would enable U.S.
prosecutors to obtain the full informational benefit of corporate
investigations and cooperation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered three principal contributions to the literature
and policy debate on corporate crime. The first is to demonstrate the pivotal
function of laws affecting the collection and use of evidence of
wrongdoing—testimonial rights and duties, legal privileges, data and
document collection and protection regimes, and other doctrines—in
allocating powers between corporations and governments in corporate
criminal enforcement. This largely unexamined phenomenon comes into
sharp relief as soon as one begins to think about the implications of adopting
a U.S.-style model of corporate criminal law and enforcement in other
jurisdictions.
The second contribution has been to show how differences in the law
governing corporate investigations in overseas nations are likely to arrange
the relative powers of prosecutors and firms quite differently. Overseas,
enforcers may have more freedom to compel witness statements without
creating complications for later litigation, may have the ability to extract and
analyze firms’ electronic evidence without restriction, and may face far
fewer barriers to uncovering evidence of wrongdoing that involves
communications between lawyers and clients. Companies may be much
more restricted in their ability to compel employee cooperation in internal
investigations, may face obstacles to fast collection and review of
employees’ electronic communications, and may be unable to shield and
control the fruits of their investigative efforts behind legal privileges. The
implication is that officials overseas should consider different sanctioning
and settlement policies in their efforts to reduce corporate crime. The
tradeoffs among forms and types of prosecutions and settlements, as well as
the forms and degree of sanctions in such proceedings, are dependent upon
testimony before U.K. Financial Conduct Authority).
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the relative roles and powers of public prosecutors and private firms in the
investigation of corporate crime.
The third contribution has been to identify the policy choices in
designing effective systems using corporate criminal liability as a
mechanism for reducing corporate crime, given differences in nations’
investigative laws. As European and other nations continue down the path of
modernizing their approaches to combatting corporate crime, a fruitful
research agenda—teaching much more about corporate enforcement both
abroad and within the United States—is sure to follow.

